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EVALUATING POLICY DECISIONS WITH DEMOGRAPHIC DATA: EVIDENCE FROM THE MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY STUDY

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ABSTRACT

The Moving to Opportunity program was initiated by The Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1992 to test the efficacy of housing vouchers for generating moves away from low poverty areas and into integrated residential settings. The experimental program divided voucher holders into groups and tracked the movement behavior of assisted and unassisted recipients. By examining the neighborhood demography of the initial and subsequent locations of the samples it is possible to assess the success of the objective of decreasing the likelihood of living in poverty and increasing the likelihood of living in integrated settings. While the program has shown some success in assisting households to live in lower poverty neighborhoods, those outcomes are less true for creating moves into integrated neighborhoods. It also appears that unassisted households may be doing nearly as well as assisted households in accessing lower poverty neighborhoods. These findings emphasize just how difficult it is to intervene in dynamic processes like housing selection and mobility, to create policy outcomes.

INTRODUCTION

In the past few years there has been a concerted effort to understand just how a neighborhood can affect individual lives. The research asks, how does living in a low-income neighborhood, or deprived neighborhoods in general, have an effect on people's lives- the jobs they have, and the health they enjoy? There has been a particular focus on the outcomes for children. Does growing up in a poor neighborhood inhibit later life chances? These questions about neighborhood effects have generated a substantial and growing literature which examines the additive marginal effects of neighborhoods on residential outcomes for inner city poverty populations. Additive, that is, in terms of explanatory power after we control for socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the household. The literature has struggled with questions of just how much is attributable to the neighborhood and how much is related to family composition. While the consensus is still forming, there does appear to be sufficient evidence to suggest that where you live does matter – certainly an outcome that is consistent with much geographic literature on the role of place.

Several specific studies including investigations of the outcomes of the Gautreaux program in Chicago, the Hollman case in Minneapolis and the extensive experimental program –Moving to Opportunity, have attempted to evaluate neighborhood effects. These

investigations have used a variety of approaches to examine whether or not mobility can lead to improved life chances. This paper re-examines that work and specifically considers the Moving to Opportunity program in Baltimore. I examine two broad sets of questions in two different contexts. First, is there evidence of living in lower poverty neighborhoods after residential mobility, and do the gains which do come about, continue with subsequent moves? Second, do the housing choices lead to living in integrated settings, and again, do these moves to greater residential integration persist over time? There are additional relevant questions about the quality of the neighborhood (including lower crime rates), educational achievement levels and levels of employment which are relevant for neighborhood outcomes, but these are not examined in the present study.

NEIGHBORHOODS AND MOBILITY

Residential mobility is a highly structured process with impacts on both the households who move and the places they choose in their relocation behavior (Clark and Dieleman, 1996). It is the basic process whereby households improve the quality of their housing and the type of neighborhoods that they inhabit and is intimately connected with urban change as a whole. Moves are transitions in people's lives and neighborhood transitions are the consequences of the aggregate of the mobility transitions of individuals. Thus, over time the sum of the myriad individual decisions by individual households leads to basic changes in the urban structure. Neighborhoods and communities change as people move in and out of them. Over time, these individual moves and the changes that they bring eventually establish the population composition of neighborhoods, and the patterns of land use and the associated patterns of commuting and traffic flows.

It is important to distinguish, both in new research and reviews of past research, between individual behaviors that *affect* neighborhoods and neighborhood affects *on* individuals. In the first sense we view mobility as the proximate cause of change although areas may have high mobility but be stable in population composition. The first conceptualization emphasizes individuals as agents moving between places and who "change" the neighborhoods that they choose. If a large number of minorities choose a neighborhood they change the ethnic composition of that neighborhood for example, though the changes may also be more subtle – say involving changes in family structure from a neighborhood without young families and children, to a neighborhood with them. Within this framework we can conceptualize aggregate neighborhood change as the outcome of individual mobility decisions. Of course neighborhoods change from other factors than residential mobility. For example, planning decisions with respect to the location of positive and negative externalities, and decisions with respect to capital expenditure in the private sector also play a role.

In the second conceptualization the focus is specifically on the neighborhood impacts on the individual who moves to that neighborhood. Does the household "gain" from moving to the particular neighborhood? In this conceptualization we are asking if the individual benefits from the "context" effects of the new neighborhood. If they move to a low poverty neighborhood do they "improve" their lives in some sense. The emphasis on context effects arose originally from public health concerns, that to improve public health,

it was important to improve housing - to overcome the concentrations of poor housing. In this sense, building public housing was a response to poor housing. Good housing promotes good health, and building housing would improve health. However, it is clear now that health has more to do with poverty than housing per se.

Predominantly, the recent work on neighborhood conditions emphasizes the latter conceptualization, that the neighborhood does play a role in shaping individual household outcomes. As we might expect, other things being equal, people want to live in "good" neighborhoods and to have their children grow up in safe environments. Thus, it is not surprising to find that there is a strong and growing perception, both in the academic community and by households themselves that growing up in a "bad" neighborhood will likely reduce the life chances of those children. The reviews of neighborhood effects have tended to stress the negative effects of poverty and low income neighborhoods and concluded that indeed there are outcomes on childhood achievement (Duncan, Brooks-Gunn, and Klebanov, 1994); and victimization in unsafe neighborhoods (Sampson, et al, 1997). Not all the literature has stressed the socio-economic characteristics of neighborhood, there are also studies of the role of environmental quality in neighborhoods and the influence this may have on the well being of residents. Pauleit (2003) emphasizes the role and value of "greenspace" in European cities, and it is clear in the Dutch context, where there is along tradition of concern with neighborhood environments, that the "rural" aspects of neighborhoods are central in residential choice patterns (Van Dam, Heins and Elbersen, 2002). Indeed some work has demonstrated that the amount of greenspace in their living environment also positively effects (self-reported) health (De Vries et al., 2003).

An anecdotal discussion of neighborhood effects on health outcomes also seems to suggest that even after controlling for socio-economic status, that people in poor neighborhoods fare less well in health-outcomes than those in non- poor neighborhoods – or as geographers are fond of saying, geography matters (Epstein, 2003). One explanation suggests that poor neighborhoods create stress, especially for African-Americans. The day to day stresses of insufficient money, crime, and living in areas with poor safety, violence, noise and housing decay create internal stresses that in turn lead to anxiety and depression. Another view emphasizes the actual neighborhood deprivation – too many bars and fast food outlets and not enough quality supermarkets, creates the poor health that seems to characterize inner city minority populations. At issue in this research is the concern to split out the effects of neighborhood independent of family socio-economic characteristics. This is made more difficult because the interaction between social class and the status of the neighborhood is clearly strong – those in poor neighborhoods are likely to be poor themselves. As middle class African American households left inner city neighborhoods, they left behind the poorest and most impoverished minority households – it is these households who are often most affected by both their socio economic status and the neighborhoods that they live in.

At least some of the stimulus for the refocus on neighborhood effects was generated by the increasing concern with high poverty concentrations. Even though there is a

contested view[1] of why and how poverty concentrations arise, there has been a consensus that the concentration of those without housing assistance in specific neighborhoods has both a negative life course outcome for such households, but an overall neighborhood effect beyond the affects on individual households. The increasing emphasis on geographically dispersing housing subsidy recipients is thus based on the assumption that residence in concentrated poverty neighborhoods abets socially dysfunctional behavior, or more simply that poverty households will do better outside of poverty neighborhoods (Galser and Zobel, 1998). The evidence from an analysis of several studies supports the view that overall, participating tenants do gain from the dispersed moves. However, the gains seem to come not from the lower concentration of poverty per se, but from the "structural advantages of the suburban areas, such as schools, public services, and job accessibility". In contrast, there is at least case study evidence that the suburbs may not be better locations for less educated job seekers (Shen, 2002). This study concludes that " residential dispersal is unlikely to be an effective strategy for removing spatial barriers to access to employment opportunities for low income workers". In terms of access to jobs, central cities are still provide greater opportunities for these workers.

MOBILITY, POVERTY DISPERSAL AND CHANGING NEIGHBORHOODS

The concern with neighborhood affects on households crystallized around the notion that concentrated poverty generates negative social effects and thus that reducing concentrated poverty, or dispersing concentrated poverty would have positive affects both on individuals and neighborhoods (Goetz, 2003). Households will gain from their improved neighborhoods and fewer poor people in a single neighborhood will increase the social status of the neighborhood, and by extension, perhaps make that neighborhood more attractive to potential in-movers. The ideas may not yet have a solid theoretical basis (Galster and Zobel, 1998) but they have led to substantial investment in measuring such outcomes and in particular three mobility programs have provided data to examine the outcomes of actual movement through urban neighborhoods.

The "mobility programs" have focused directly on the second of the two conceptualizations discussed earlier, the actual affect of neighborhood on the outcomes for those who move into new "more desirable" neighborhoods. In broad terms the "mobility programs" have as a central policy aim, the movement of households from perceived "bad" neighborhoods to perceived "good" neighborhoods. Such studies have attempted to separate the true effects of neighborhoods from the effects of families or social networks on the outcomes (Briggs, 1997). The tentative results have found that those who moved to suburban neighborhoods were more likely to be employed and the respondents reported greater neighborhood safety.

The mobility programs are in turn a reflection of the changing notions of how to provide housing to low income households. Where once the focus was on providing

[1] On the one hand Wilson (1987) and Hughes (1989) emphasize the impact of macro economic structural changes which have taken jobs away from the inner city and so disadvantaged inner city minor residents, while on the other, Yinger (1998) argues that the concentrations of poverty are the outcomes ofhistoric patterns of discrimination including the intentional citing of public housing in inner city areas.

specific projects for low-income households in need of assisted housing, now the emphasis is on giving low-income households a choice within the residential fabric.[2] Where once the aim was to provide help at fixed locations, now the housing voucher program, the largest assisted housing program within HUD, aims to help households access housing in the private housing market. The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program grew out of the Experimental Housing Allowance studies of the 1970s, and was first initiated as the Section 8 Certificate program. In the 1980s, the Housing Voucher Program was initiated, and the two programs were merged as the Housing Choice Voucher program in 1998.

Evaluating mobility programs

The first of the evaluations of the effects of moving from a high poverty neighborhood arose out of litigation over discrimination in the provision of public housing. The outcome of the Gautreaux decision (in 1976) was to provide a metropolitan wide mobility program in which Section 8 subsidies were provided to public housing residents so that they could move from the inner city of Chicago to suburban white communities. The research from the Gautreaux program provided some evidence that those who moved to suburban communities were more likely to be in employment (though the salaries were not necessarily higher) and that suburban youth do better on several educational measures (Rosenbaum, 1995). While the results of the Gautreaux program cannot be considered conclusive evidence in the favor of such programs, it did offer insights to into a possible successful program, but one that required substantial additional housing services if the program was to succeed. At least one of the problems in assessing the Gautreaux program was the substantial drop out rates from the program (Rosenbaum, 1995).

A more recent program also focused on the redistribution of low-income public housing residents in Minneapolis, and also provided mixed findings on the outcomes. As part of a consent decree in Minneapolis (Hollman v Cisneros, 1995) a large public family complex in the inner city of Minneapolis was demolished. The residents of that project created a substantial number of relocatees. An analysis of the data from the Hollman case suggests a number of important findings for the study of how relocation from inner city minority neighborhoods will play out in the larger urban scale. Not all residents of the projects that were demolished were willing participants in the relocation project, Southeast Asian households were much more resistant to forced relocation than were African American households. "To a great extent displaced families had little desire to move far away…most wanted to stay in Minneapolis" (Goetz, 2004, p.203). Those who indicated a desire to leave the city wanted in the most part to move only to the inner ring of suburbs directly north of the city, i.e. close to where they lived before they moved. Preferences for familiar neighborhoods are especially strong in the project residents.

Special mobility program participants (a group specified in the Hollman consent decree) were much more likely to move to the suburbs, but the preference of most families

[2] Nationally, HUD has funded approximately 1.26 million public housing units, 1.4 million units in assisted housing programs and 1.5 million households in the housing voucher program – see the report Housing Choice Voucher Location Patterns: Implications for Participant and Neighborhood Welfare, January, 2003.

(about half of participants) was to stay in the central city – in Minneapolis. Moving nearby, to their original location, was an important outcome of the intervention process. More than half of all participants in the Special Mobility Program (SMP) stayed in the central city. And, by ethnicity the results were much more central city oriented – 90 percent of Southeast Asian participants chose to say in the central city. But even large numbers of African Americans chose to stay in the Central City. Still, for those families that moved out of central city neighborhoods, it appears that there were gains in quality of living.

The Gautreaux housing case in Chicago was the basis for the HUD experimental program Moving to Opportunity (MTO). The aim of the MTO program was to find out "what happens when very poor families have the chance to move out of subsidized housing in the poorest neighborhoods of five very large American cities". The program was initiated in 1992 with a mandate from Congress to HUD to test the usefulness of housing vouchers for generating moves away from low poverty areas and into integrated residential settings. Five cities, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York were selected to participate in the program. The experimental program divided voucher holders into three groups. The baseline group did not receive a voucher and continued to live in public or assisted housing. The Section 8 group received a voucher and regular housing assistance counseling. The experimental group received a voucher and special mobility counseling but was required to move to a low poverty neighborhood (less than 10 percent poverty according to the 1990 Census.)

The most recent summary report of the MTO project (Moving to Opportunity, Final Interim Report 2003) suggests that the MTO program has had substantial effects on housing and the neighborhood conditions of participants, especially on perceptions of safety, but mixed effects for educational gains, employment, earnings and public assistance. It is the results on mobility, as we will see, which reiterate the great difficulty of intervening in the dynamic of household relocation. The results to be reported later reiterate the classic discussion of human behavior. As Tiebout (1956) observed - households vote with their feet, and decisions by governments are always embedded in the dynamic demography of the city. Thus, mobility is "*a consistent and pervasive behavior forming a major element of the policy context; it affects the conditions under which policies are developed and exerts a strong influence on their outcomes"* (Moore and Clark, 1980, p.10).

The strong gains in self reported safety and housing quality for MTO and Section 8 movers must be offset with mixed results with respect to living in reduced poverty neighborhoods. The final report states that MTO experimental members did not, on average, spend much time in census tracts with lower poverty levels, though there are differences in the neighborhood characteristics for the experimental group and the control group. In addition, nearly half the MTO movers chose neighborhoods that increased in poverty during the 1990s. Perhaps even more telling, but consistent with our knowledge of mobility in general, subsequent moves by the MTO group were often to neighborhoods like the ones they came from and in some cases back to their old neighborhoods. Once again, we can identify two forces at work – the changing demography of the city (increases in poverty in inner city tracts as their demography changed), and housing choices and preferences which favor known neighborhoods where there are friends,

family and support relationships.

The preliminary analyses of the Moving to Opportunity programs, have not focused in detail on the relocation behavior of households overtime, and have not examined the extent to which assisted households have been able to access more integrated residential environments. Both questions are relevant in the light of the discussions of using vouchers to improve neighborhood opportunities and specifically the intent of the MTO program (following Gautreaux) to address the residential segregation of minority households. The findings of this analysis reiterate (a) the difficulty of intervening in the residential mobility process, (b) the tendency of households, all other things being equal, to move to nearby neighborhoods, (c) the constraints of moving to more expensive neighborhoods for low income households, and (d) the difficulty of creating greater residential integration through housing vouchers.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANALYSIS

The current research is built around three questions – what are the differences in accessing low poverty neighborhoods between initial and long term residential relocations for assisted and unassisted households, what are the differences in accessing more integrated residential neighborhoods between initial and long term residential relocations for assisted and unassisted households, and how do households who did not receive assistance fare in their housing market decisions?

The findings from Baltimore- poverty outcomes

Experimental movers in Baltimore made significant initial gains in entering lower poverty neighborhoods in their first lease-up[3] (Table 1). Of course this is to be expected, as the program specifically required leasing in a low poverty neighborhood. While nearly all experimental movers choose neighborhoods which were less than 20 percent poverty neighborhoods, only 23 percent of the regular Section 8 movers did so. The question which is central here is to what extent did the movers, experimental and Section 8, sustain the original gains after subsequent moves. Households moved and of course neighborhoods change over time but we will hold the neighborhood constant by using 2000 Census data.

The outcomes at the current time are significantly more mixed (Table 1). The distribution of the experimental movers is somewhat like the current distribution for the Section 8 movers, even so, the distributions are still statistically significantly different (on a Kolmogorov two sample test) from one another. That is, there are greater gains in being in a lower poverty neighborhood for experimental movers than for regular Section 8 movers. When we compare the distributions of the experimental movers in their initial locations and their current locations we find that the distributions are significantly different on both Chi square and Kolmogorov tests. We can conclude that while there are initial gains those gains

[3] Lease up is the terminology to describe the process of successfully using the housing voucher to rent a housing unit and move. To reiterate, there are three groups in the study, experimental movers who are given a housing voucher and counseling, regular Section 8 movers who are given a housing voucher and the baseline or control group who are not provided with assistance.

decline over time. Additional moves clearly affect the ability to sustain the original gains in living in lower poverty neighborhoods.

An alternate way of assessing the success of the experimental program is to place the gains in the context of the total sample responses. Many fewer experimental households were able to lease up than were regular Section 8 voucher holders (Table 2). This is to be expected of course from the stringent requirements on the experimental program which required leasing a housing unit in specified low poverty neighborhoods. While less than half of the experimental sample were able to lease in a low poverty neighborhood, more than 60 percent of the regular voucher holders, without the constraint of leasing in a low poverty neighborhood were able to do so. Thus, if we combine movers and non-movers in the program for both experimental and regular Section 8 voucher holders the differences across the distributions are quite minor. That is, the overall gains from the MTO program virtually disappear (Table 3). There is no significant difference between the MTO experimental sample of movers and non-movers and the control sample – those who did not receive a voucher. There is no significant difference between experimental movers and non-movers and Section 8 movers and non-movers. Interestingly, there is a marginally significant difference (at the .05 level) between Section 8 movers and non-movers and the control sample. Clearly, there are differences between movers and non-movers as we would expect but that difference is hardly sufficient to fundamentally differentiate those who received help from those who did not receive either assistance or assistance and special counseling. It is troublesome for a policy of poverty dispersal that overall, the current distribution of control households who neither received vouchers or experimental help is only marginally more likely to show households in high poverty neighborhoods than the aggregate of experimental and control group movers (Table 3).

The findings from Baltimore – integration outcomes

An implicit argument that grows out of the Gautreaux litigation was that mobility would give minority families an opportunity to live in less segregated neighborhoods – that requiring families to move to low poverty neighborhoods would also result in desegregation. The title of the MTO program is in fact "Moving to Opportunity for *Fair Housing Demonstration Program"*. In general the program seems to have been only partially successful in this aim. The analysis shows that Section 8 families, without the low poverty requirement, have not moved to neighborhoods with lower concentrations of minorities, and although experimental group families have moved to neighborhoods with lower minority concentrations the effect is small relative to the overall levels of racial isolation.

A specific analysis of the effects of moving on racial patterns in Baltimore confirms the difficulty in using vouchers to increase racial integration. The table of residential choices by racial composition shows that the initial moves of the MTO experimental group does result in greater integration for the initial move (Table 4). The pattern for Section 8 movers shows less overall integration but still some gains in living in less segregated settings. The City of Baltimore was about 64 percent minority in 2000.

Examining current residential locations for MTO movers we find that the gains are not nearly as strong by the time of the current survey in 2002 (Table 5). The results for the Section 8 regular movers are not especially different from the initial mover choices. There is no significant difference between the *current residence* distribution for experimental movers and Section 8 movers. Both Chi square and Kolmogorov two sample tests failed to detect any difference between the distributions of current residence locations for these groups.[4] That the Section 8 and MTO distributions are not statistically different from each other suggests that on the issue of racial integration we must treat the gains from the MTO program with some caution. The distributions for Section 8 movers and experimental movers are significantly different from the control sample, but in the case of Section 8 movers the difference is only marginally significant at the .05 level. Again these results reiterate the difficulty of intervening in residential choice. Mobility decisions are complex and are set within family, neighborhood and work contexts.

Mapping the initial distribution of the sample, the distribution of the Section 8 and experimental movers after the first move and their current locations provides additional understanding of the outcomes of the MTO program. To set the context, Figure 1 portrays the distribution of all three sub-samples. They are relatively evenly divided by location in the inner city neighborhoods of Baltimore. (Figure 1).

The constraint of finding a leasable unit in a low poverty neighborhood made it more difficult for the experimental group to make a successful move. Regular Section 8 holders without this constraint were more successful in finding a unit. In Baltimore 58 percent of the experimental families moved while 72 percent of the Section 8 group moved (Table 2). By evaluating the patterns of residences after relocation and then again for the current time period we can evaluate the outcomes of the movement behaviors of the two groups- the experimental group and the regular Section 8 movers. Those experimental households who were able to find a unit in a low poverty neighborhood are more dispersed and more likely to live in suburban neighborhoods (Figure 2). There are significant numbers of MTO movers in the western suburbs of Baltimore County and there are many voucher holders in the Baltimore city communities of Hamilton, Morgan Heights and Lauraville (in the northeast sections of the city). Similar results are apparent in the report on the MTO program from Abt Associates (Moving to opportunity for fair housing demonstration program: current status and initial findings). The map shows considerable dispersal of MTO voucher holders. As expected they are not in central city neighborhoods which are high poverty areas.

A map of the current residences suggests that while the program has had initial success it may be hard to sustain the patterns of dispersal.[5] Many more MTO households

[4] Because there may be questions about the relevance of chi square tests when the distributions are drawn from different samples I computed both chi square and Kolmogorov two-sample test as a comfirmatory analysis.

[5] An interim analysis of the total MTO program suggested that MTO movers were staying in their new communities (see John Goering et al 2002). A cross site analysis of initial moving to opportunity demonstration results, Journal of Housing Research 13, 1-30). However, the results must be treated with caution as the data were for a shorter time period than the more recent data provided by HUD.

are now located in the City of Baltimore at the end of the evaluation period, that is, we can infer a return to familiar neighborhoods in the City.[6] At the same time, some non-experimental households (regular Section 8 voucher holders) have been able to move to and remain in the low poverty neighborhoods in the northeast of the City of Baltimore and the suburbs in Baltimore County to the west of the City (Figure 3).

The MTO samples were self-selected households who expressed a desire to move. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the "control group" who was not given vouchers also had significant mobility rates. In fact, the control group actually had higher mobility than either the experimental participants or the regular Section 8 participants (Table 2). Their geographic mobility also emphasizes the opportunities available to all households, experimental and non-experimental. While many households in the control group moved nearby, many households were also able to move to neighborhoods in the Northeastern communities of Baltimore City and to the suburbs (Figure 4). Even without vouchers and the special counseling of the MTO program these households moved away from the projects in the inner city. Clearly, some portion of these movers were displaced by housing demolition in the central city. In the past decade approximately a thousand public housing units have been removed and some of the residents in these projects were part of the control group. At this point, just how many of these households were forcibly moved is not known. Even so, that many of them made choices which are not so dissimilar to the assisted households does raise questions about the policy effectiveness of the special subsidy MTO program.

CONCLUSION

Overall it seems that the special MTO program, while partially successful, and clearly an indication of HUD's concern to find mechanisms for diffusing the pattern of minority concentration, is at the same time an indication of how difficult it is to intervene in the complex process of housing choice. Income and assets are critical and integral parts of the choice process as are neighborhood composition preferences. Simply providing a housing voucher does not negate the powerful forces in the choice process. In addition the evidence of return to known and familiar neighborhoods is an indicator of the way in which housing choices are embedded in the larger urban structure. There is evidence too, that non-movers also make gains. Non-movers with more time in the community and the possibility of tapping into the opportunity structure of the neighborhood are actually likely to have higher employment rates than movers. [7] Clearly, moving is not a simple solution to problems of poor families nor does the mere existence of a dispersed pattern of assisted households guarantee moves out of poverty, or success in the labor market.

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[6] The data on actual origins and destinations of the moves was not made available for this analysis.

[7] Housing Choice Voucher Location Patterns: Implications for Participant and Neighborhood Welfare, US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, January, 2003.

In the most recent presentation of the results from the five sample cities, the review of the MTO program tends to the favorable and positive. *"Thus the MTO treatment led to significant differences in where families moved with the program vouchers. By the time of the interim evaluation these differences had narrowed somewhat because of subsequent moves and changes over the period in neighborhood poverty rates, but they had not disappeared." (*Orr, et al, 2003, p.46). The results from this study of Baltimore raises real questions about that interpretation. While the mobility patterns of the experimental families may have placed them in significantly better environments than the control group, the differences between the experimental and the regular Section 8 movers at their current locations are small at best. To reiterate, any policy that intervenes in the dynamics of the city, especially one which uses mobility itself as a policy, is subject to outcomes which are driven by factors well outside of the control of the experimental program.

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Table 1

PERCENT OF MTO AND SECTION 8 RESPONDENTS BY THEIR ORIGINAL MOVE LOCATION AND IN THEIR CURRENT BALTIMORE LOCATIONS BY POVERTY COMPOSITION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

	Original move		Current location	
% Poverty	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 10	40.7	6.8	24.2	8.6
10- 20	57.9	15.9	33.3	19.8
20- 30	.7	25.8	15.8	27.6
30- 40	.7	36.4	14.2	23.3
40- 50		13.6	7.5	12.9
50- 60		1.5	5.0	6.9
60- 70				.9

Source: MTO data for Baltimore prepared by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research

Table 2

GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY IN THE 2003 EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT FOR ALL FIVE CITIES

	MTO Group	Section 8 Group	Control Group
Leased up	47.4	61.7	N/a
No lease up			
Moved	35.0	22.7	69.6
Stayed	17.5	15.7	30.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Moving to Opportunity: Interim Impacts Evaluation (2003) Final Report, June.

Table 3

PERCENT OF TOTAL MTO, TOTAL SECTION 8, AND BASELINE RESPONDENTS BY THEIR CURRENT BALTIMORE LOCATIONS BY POVERTY COMPOSITION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

%Poverty	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 10	15.0	6.6	3.6
10- 20	23.7	21.7	21.4
20- 30	14.5	24.7	16.1
30- 40	17.4	18.7	15.5
40- 50	13.5	14.5	14.3
50- 60	14.5	13.3	25.6
60- 70	1.4	.6	3.6

Source: MTO data for Baltimore prepared by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research

Table 4

MOVE OUTCOMES OF MTO AND SECTION 8 RESPONDENTS BY RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

% Black	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 20	7.1	3.8
20- 40	27.9	10.6
40- 60	18.6	9.1
60- 80	15.0	15.9
80-100	31.4	60.6

Source: MTO data for Baltimore prepared by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research

Table 5

MTO AND SECTION 8 RESPONDENTS IN THEIR CURRENT BALTIMORE LOCATIONS BY RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

% Black	MTO Non-mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 20	3.4	5.8	3.4
20- 40	2.3	13.3	14.7
40- 60	10.3	10.0	7.7
60- 80	4.6	15.8	11.2
80-100	79.3	55.0	62.9

Source: MTO data for Baltimore prepared by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research

Figure 1.
Initial Location of the Experimental Sample in the Moving to Opportunity Study



Source: Data from HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research

Figure 2. Residences After Relocation of Households in the MTO Study



Source: Data from HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research

Figure 3. Current Residence Experimental Voucher Households Who Moved 1994-2003



Source: Data from HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research

Figure 4. Residential Choices of the MTO Control Sample



Source: Data from HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research