# TIMING OF RETIREMENT AND TRANSITION OF PAID EMPLOYMENT IN RELATION TO FAMILY OBLIGATIONS

A BRIEF PROPOSAL

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The potential impact of familial responsibilities is extremely relevant for retirement research. The decision to retire is increasingly less a consequence of health concerns and more likely related to familial demands such as provision of care and finances across generations. Unfortunately, the retirement literature to date has not addressed this issue, while the research on care giving explores limitations to labor force participation across all ages. Retirement is an important outcome particularly if it excludes the retiree from the health insurance benefits when it perhaps is most expensive. Also, the convex profile in the pension scheme could mean that retirement costs due to leaving the work force when the pension accrues most rapidly could be sizeable. Additionally, the labor supply - care giving literature deviates from the more plausible fact that wage and hours often are offered as a bundle and so concentrating solely on hours of work perhaps is not the best representation of the costs associated with withdrawal from the labor market in one form or another. Family obligations of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary nature might arise from a variety of sources – e.g., spouses, parents, children, grandchildren, and others. Longer life expectancy and earlier retirement provisions imply that retirement-age individuals would need to contemplate about those possible responsibilities in conjunction with the retirement decision. In effect, the nature of family obligation would impart different impact on retirement transition patterns.

The proposed paper intends to explore the relationship between realizations of retirement, either in the form of complete withdrawal from the labor force or in terms of substantial reduction in the hours of paid employment, and the role of familial obligations. It is probable that obligations to provide time assistance to parents or grandchildren as well as sick children and spouses might raise the odds of early retirement. On the other hand, financial responsibilities to adult children or parents could delay retirement. There remains the need to study if a differential effect for male and female workers approaching retirement exists. While retirement decisions could be triggered by sudden disability or other accidental events of family members it is also probable that the accumulation of strains associated with an ongoing care giving episode or multiple episodes influence a person's decision to withdraw from the labor force.

It has been suggested in the literature that an adult child's transfers of money and time to parents respond to the economic situation of the adult child, including the opportunity

cost of time as measured by the wage rate. An increase in an adult child's income and wealth increases transfers to parents while an increase in the wage rate increases financial transfers and decreases time transfers (Schoeni, 1993). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that a high wage child substitutes financial transfers for time transfers. Since the decision of the timing of retirement essentially has bearings on the income and wealth of a person it is worthwhile to consider how the former might be impacted by familial responsibilities, involving provision of time and financial assistance. Retirement patterns are likely to vary according to family structure and marital status. The presence, or absence, of spouses, dependent children (and/or grandchildren), and elderly parents has substantial effects on retirement patterns for both men and women. Aside parents, individuals' near-retirement employment decisions essentially are to be also influenced by their responsibilities towards their future generations, either in the form of providing financial ease to children or ensuring family comfort through means of sharing workload in home production activities such as rearing up of grandchildren.

The aging of the US population has raised concerns about the long-term solvency of Social Security and Medicare. Understanding what motivates individuals to continue working beyond the usual retirement age and what triggers their relatively earlier withdrawal from the labor force will be an important ingredient in formulating programs and policies aimed at improving their financial security and general well being.

Although many older Americans do not want to continue working full time on their career jobs, many do prefer to remain active in the labor market, often part time, sometimes self-employed, and often in a completely new line of work. It is possible that to certain extent these phenomena are the result of time allocation motives for the dependents. Also it would be interesting to see if there is a time versus earnings consideration to move to a transitional *bridge job* that requires lesser work-hours while still ensuring enough income to sustain the pecuniary needs of the dependents. Essentially, the study of retirement is complicated due to the fact that retirement itself might not be an absorbing state. Self-employment and part-time work could in effect be very well considered as retirement states if these variations of employment lack in non-wage benefits. Labor market rigidities might not allow a person phasing out of high-paying and high benefit job to come back to a similar employment. Under such considerations the cost of retirement could be substantial.

Preferences for providing care and financial support might as well differ between the sexes. Most of the existing literature argues either for gender neutrality or that women favor their parents and children more than men do (Thomas, 1994). To understand how workers make retirement decisions and which factors influence the timing of labor force withdrawals, it is important to recognize that retirement is a family decision. Obviously, married couples' (and hence married men and women's) response would be different from those of single men and women faced with retirement decisions.

## II. HYPOTHESES CONCERNING RETIREMENT, EMPLOYMENT, AND TIME AND MONEY TRANSFERS

The investigation of retirement – complete or partial – and money and time assistance can be formulated on the standard economic assumption that individuals are rational utility-maximizers. In order to focus on the key elements of the study, we shall assume that individuals value only the consumption of physical goods, leisure, and the well-being of their elderly parents, children and grandchildren.

In a hypothetical model in which all the determinants of informal care provision are predetermined an increase in parent's demand for care is equivalent to a simple reduction in the total amount of time available to the child and therefore lowers equilibrium labor supply. But more realistic is that the family might allocate care giving and financial assistance responsibilities on the basis of endogenous characteristics. It is plausible that family members expect that children who work in the home to provide greater amounts of informal care while children who work in the labor market would provide larger financial help. A Parent's utility function can be modeled as a concave function of the amount of assistance received from children that could in turn enter the child's utility function either because of altruism or because of bequest motive. In that case, the child weighs providing care against other uses of her time. Naturally children whose time costs are greater than the price of formal care would be more inclined to purchase formal care, while those whose time costs are lower will provide the care themselves[1].

In such cases informal care giving is endogenously determined within the model and hence is a source of bias that is likely to overstate the impact of informal care giving on transition in paid employment. This is because factors that increase market hours, such as higher offered wage rates or greater performance for market versus home production, simultaneously decrease home production. The negative correlation between informal care giving and the error term will normally reinforce the negative impact of care giving on market hours. However, it is possible that second-order effects from correlations with other regressors can change the direction of the bias. For this reason, it is rather implausible to predict from the model whether ordinary estimation techniques will over- or underestimate the care giving effect. Empirical analysis must be relied upon to answer this question.

The formal structural model of parental care, financial transfer, employment and retirement while is still to be appropriately modeled, it might be noted that a useful starting point for analyzing the effect of care giving on retirement patterns is the standard microeconomic model of the allocation of time. If we focus on the children of elderly parents who might have a need for some type of transfer, either in cash or in kind, a reasonable approach might be to treat the quantities of each mode of time transfer received by the parent as factors influencing parental well being which in turn would

[1] It must be pointed out that while the choice of time versus monetary transfers is logically a simultaneous one, there could be instances where financial support is provided not just to serve the purpose of purchasing care. However, it might not be possible to treat money transfers meant for formal care and other usage separately either in the theory and more so in the data.

enter as arguments of the child's utility function. The child has the option to provide direct care, using one's own time; or a composite mode of care from alternative sources. The price of the chosen care arrangements must also be incorporated into the budget constraint. For all practical purposes, we have to assume that there are no monetary costs to providing direct care, but that there might be a monetary cost to using the other care mode (it could be zero if, for instance, other siblings were the alternative source of parental care; or it would bear a price if it is a formal care arrangement). In this setting, the well being of parents is assumed to be a function of their health, the amount of assistance in the form of time or money they receive from their child, and the amount of assistance they receive from other sources. In this model, all decisions are made by altruistic adult children; parents are treated as passive recipients of their child's assistance. Then, a utility function for the individual could incorporate the utility derived from parental well-being, along with that obtained through his own consumption of goods and leisure.

While testable hypotheses for the paper can be constructed only once the formal structural model is built and all the relevant comparative statics have been carried out, we shall at the outset propose a number of hypotheses which it is believed could be tested empirically if the issue of endogeneity could be properly accounted for.

**Hypothesis 1**
Those who are responsible for provision of substantial informal time assistance towards family members are more likely to phase out of the labor market earlier compared to their non-caregiving counterparts. Consequently, there might be a higher retirement rate for the former category, or, at the least, a greater tendency to accommodate work hours.

**Hypothesis 2**
The need to provide financial assistance towards parents as well as children (and/or grandchildren) could lead to continuing work reflecting increased economic burden. Also if caregiving responsibilities involve formal support services for the recipient that also would delay retirement in contrast to those who are not faced with similar obligations.

**Hypothesis 3**
With regard to informal care giving married women are more likely to experience greater dissimilarity in their retirement rates than non-caregivers. On the other hand, financial and economic necessity implied by provision of pecuniary assistance might widen the discrepancy in labor market transition pattern of donor single women and men with the non-donors.

Eventually we would want to model and estimate probable effects of time and money transfers to parents, effects of time transfers to sick children and spouses, and grandchildren, and effects of financial support towards adult children on individual's retirement decision.

## III. DATA: THE HEALTH AND RETIREMENT STUDY (HRS)

Data from the *Health and Retirement Study* (HRS) is believed to be extremely helpful in assessing family support networks. The HRS respondents are of the age at which individuals are most likely to be contemplating retirement plans alongside its various direct and indirect economic repercussions which essentially has bearings on carrying out family obligations.

The Health and Retirement Study tracks changes in the structure of the vertically extended family and the individual life-cycle dynamics of respondents, their children, and their parents. Parallel data are available on the families of both spouses/partners. Transfers of time, money, and shared housing to and from HRS respondents are well represented. Each transfer is uniquely linked to a specific donor and recipient. It is also possible to use the HRS to explore questions about the involvement of grandparents with grandchildren. In addition to family data, HRS collects information on respondents' health, functioning, health care use, health insurance, labor force activity, and income and assets.

The HRS is a longitudinal biennial survey of US population that had its first wave of interview in 1992. Since the proposed study is at its very preliminary stage and the tenability of any particular structural model and the relevant econometric estimation techniques are yet not been assessed, the use of data for the remainder of this report will be based on the 1998 survey of HRS. Since there are potentially important benefits that might be reaped from exploiting the panel nature of HRS, ultimately we would like to make use of as many of the waves as would be deemed worthwhile.

From the standpoint of a cross-sectional study, the advantage of exploiting the 1998 wave of the HRS interview is that it allows for cross-sectional analysis over a large age range of individuals. The HRS 1998 represents the fourth wave of the original HRS panel of individuals born between 1931 and 1941 first surveyed in 1992. It also incorporates the third wave of the AHEAD (born 1923 and earlier) and the first waves of the Children of the Depression Age (CODA) (born 1924 - 1930) and War Baby (born 1942 - 1947) cohorts. In all, HRS 1998 constitutes a nationally representative sample of over 30,000 individuals born before 1948 and their spouses.

## IV. SOME INITIAL DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES

Retired individuals in the HRS interview were asked a series of questions regarding the reasons behind their retiring. Table 1 presents tabulations of percentage in the sample mentioning different grounds for retirement by age of actual retirement. Most notable for the purpose of our study is the substantial proportion of individuals in all age groups that report spending time with family as the reason for retiring. In fact, this motivation seems to be the most important one in comparison to all the others. While 24 percent of individuals retiring between ages 50-60 reported poor health was a very important reason,

family was cited as the chief consideration by 32 percent and it appears to remain substantial through all ages.[2]

Now the question remains is to what extent spending time with family is indeed motivated by the need of care provision. Since we hypothesize that financial obligation would delay retirement on average, a question as to what influences individuals most to stay on the labor force after midlife would have been interesting. In absence of that nevertheless, Table 2 sheds some light on correlations between different types of responsibilities and work status. Both in terms of percentage and amount, fully retired women tend to provide the maximum amount of parental care, while full-time working women provide largest financial help. For men, those who are partially retired are the largest care providers. This could be due to the fact that some fully retired men are quite old and/or are not as healthy as their partially retired counterparts.

Table 3 and Table 4 report, respectively, the percentage of women and that of men providing time assistance and financial transfers to parents by work status and other characteristics. In terms of both basic personal care assistance and help with chores or errands, those who are retired tend to provide time to parents more compared to those working across all age groups. Help with chores and errands are more prevalent that assisting with basic care.[3] Working women are more likely to provide financial support at various ages, though for women in the age of 55-64 the difference is negligible. This is a useful finding when put into perspective with the earlier retirement provisions. For men, the results are a bit confounding. Men aged 45-64 tend to offer larger financial support to their parents if they are retired. This might be due to some selection issues as to who happens to be the care-provider as well as what other financial factors could possibly play a role in allowing men in this age group to retire.

Hispanic men and women appear to be more likely to help chores and errands than whites or blacks. Women who are currently married tend more to make money transfer, and this is perhaps reflective of the importance of household (spousal) income. Women with more years of education beyond college graduate and men who are college graduate and those who have further education seems more likely to offer financial support even when they are retired. Naturally, with higher education, they were more likely to be placed into well-paid jobs so that their life savings were larger and hence could provide money transfer to parents with ease.

With respect to individuals' health status one finding is that women who report to have fair or poor health tend to provide more parental care than their healthier counterparts. This might be due to some endogeneity again where additional care burden causes

[2] In the last column of Table 1, the proportion of retirees who said they were forced to retire but did not claim health or spending time with family as being important reasons for retirement is reported. This percentage increases from 15 percent at ages 50-58 to 25 percent of those retiring at age 80 and above. By controlling for other reasons for retirement, this fraction provides indirect evidence that at least some older workers exit the labor force because they feel their employer is forcing them to leave either explicitly or by not offering them jobs that accommodate their desire for flexible work schedules or other non-pecuniary job characteristics.

[3] Help with personal care, however, was more time intensive than was help with chores and errands.

women emotional turmoil and consequently they consider themselves to be less healthy. Working men and women who reported that the financial situation of their parents was worse than their own were more likely to provide monetary support than were those retired. On the other hand, of those who reported that their parents' financial situations were better than their own, retired people are more likely to provide financial support. Living arrangements also influenced the provision of care. Adult children in our sample were more likely to help when they lived with or near their parents. This again suggests a concern for endogeneity with regard to transfer and retirement behavior.

## V. REMARKS

Apparently if a structural model is formulated to define the necessary relationship among the variables of interest, and the comparative statics done to justify the testable hypotheses, the greater challenge will be to econometrically implement and test the model. The endogeneity and selection problem that are intertwined within the system of equations have to be appropriately dealt with to pursue the study. The paper will exploit the longitudinal nature of the HRS data and gauge transition to retirement from one time period to another in an attempt to capture the impact of transfer behavior. Retirement is institutionalized, not only in programs such as Social Security and Medicare, but also in the subjective expectations of workers. Older workers have individual timetables for when they plan to retire. HRS also documents some insightful information with respect to subjective probability with regard to labor force behavior along with some other issues. That information will also be explored with a view to resolve the complexity of the problem.

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## TABLE 1: REASONS FOR RETIREMENT

| Age Category | "Forced" | Poor Health | Spend Time with Family | Wanted to Do Other Things | Did Not Like Work | "Forced", Not Family or Health[a] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **50-58** | 0.38 | 0.24 | 0.32 | 0.25 | 0.04 | 0.15 |
| **59-61** | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.30 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| **62-64** | 0.31 | 0.18 | 0.34 | 0.27 | 0.07 | 0.13 |
| **65-67** | 0.28 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0.29 | 0.05 | 0.13 |
| **68-70** | 0.28 | 0.13 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.05 | 0.18 |
| **71-74** | 0.31 | 0.13 | 0.26 | 0.19 | 0.04 | 0.16 |
| **75-79** | 0.40 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.14 | 0.04 | 0.19 |
| **>=80** | 0.46 | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.25 |

a. Percentage of retirees who reported being forced to retire but did not report family or poor health being important.
Data Source: 1998 Health and Retirement Survey.

## TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE PROVIDING TIME ASSISTANCE AND FINANCIAL TRANSFER TO PARENTS, AND AMOUNT RECEIVED BY PARENTS, CONDITIONAL ON RECEIVING, BY WORK AND RETIREMENT STATUS OF INDIVIDUALS

[Data Source: 1998 Health and Retirement Survey.]

| | Help with Basic Care[a] | | Help with Chores and Errands[a] | | Financial Help[b] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Percent Providing Help | Mean Hours Provided | Percent Providing Help | Mean Hours Provided | Percent Providing Help | Mean Dollar Amount Provided |
| ***Men*** | | | | | | |
| Full-Retirement: Self-Report | 12.33 | 565.39 | 37.49 | 400.50 | 12.94 | 2957.85 |
| | | (847.23) | | (760.57) | | (3970.03) |
| Partial-Retirement: Self-Report | 14.23 | 667.01 | 40.46 | 378.95 | 13.04 | 2547.65 |
| | | (833.87) | | (629.12) | | (3053.32) |
| Working: Not Retired At All | 8.67 | 582.74 | 29.99 | 312.24 | 16.87 | 3692.56 |
| | | (874.24) | | (471.87) | | (7728.17) |
| ***Women*** | | | | | | |
| Full-Retirement: Self-Report | 19.33 | 881.27 | 44.41 | 387.91 | 11.05 | 2329.33 |
| | | (1321.02) | | (632.94) | | (2923.67) |
| Partial-Retirement: Self-Report | 10.41 | 360.11 | 45.50 | 365.83 | 9.80 | 1690.82 |
| | | (370.08) | | (605.89) | | (1783.48) |
| Working: Not Retired At All | 10.36 | 787.93 | 32.22 | 304.73 | 13.46 | 3485.52 |
| | | (1106.70) | | (368.52) | | (7893.26) |

a. Includes time assistance of at least 100 hours in the past 12 months.
b. Includes only financial assistance of at least $500 in the past 12 months.
c. Standard deviation is in parenthesis.

## TABLE 3: TIME ASSISTANCE AND FINANCIAL TRANSFER FROM WOMEN TO PARENTS, BY WORK STATUS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

| | Percentage Who Help with Basic Care[a] | | Percentage Who Help with Chores and Errands[a] | | Percentage Who Provide Financial Help[b] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Working* | *Retired* | *Working* | *Retired* | *Working* | *Retired* |
| **Age** | | | | | | |
| 45 – 54 | 9.04 | 15.00 | 30.39 | 46.91 | 11.61 | 7.60 |
| 55 – 64 | 11.42 | 19.42 | 34.26 | 45.09 | 14.71 | 14.42 |
| 65 – 74 | 12.96 | 20.27 | 35.66 | 43.87 | 12.12 | 7.53 |
| 75 – 84 | -- | 20.79 | -- | 45.83 | 36.74 | 12.57 |
| **Race** | | | | | | |
| White | 10.35 | 19.95 | 34.89 | 44.97 | 11.53 | 10.33 |
| Black | 11.91 | 17.69 | 30.35 | 47.60 | 19.47 | 14.86 |
| Other Race | 7.10 | 11.13 | 32.49 | 29.03 | 37.86 | 15.23 |
| Hispanic | 8.79 | 10.55 | 27.80 | 23.74 | 25.70 | 10.10 |
| **Marital Status** | | | | | | |
| Currently Married | 9.89 | 16.85 | 33.63 | 42.75 | 12.48 | 13.00 |
| Separated or Divorced | 9.32 | 22.94 | 33.15 | 45.48 | 13.47 | 5.37 |
| Widow | 11.22 | 24.94 | 32.14 | 48.86 | 11.62 | 7.38 |
| Never married | 20.25 | 20.61 | 51.77 | 56.97 | 25.42 | 17.90 |
| **Education** | | | | | | |
| Attended High School But Did Not Graduate | 10.84 | 21.23 | 31.28 | 33.70 | 15.71 | 13.59 |
| High School Graduate | 10.76 | 19.60 | 32.28 | 46.70 | 11.24 | 5.28 |
| Attended Fewer than Four Years of College | 10.11 | 18.30 | 34.83 | 52.19 | 13.11 | 10.81 |
| College Graduate and Beyond | 9.68 | 20.15 | 33.99 | 44.02 | 14.61 | 18.56 |
| **Health Status** | | | | | | |
| Excellent | 9.39 | 22.02 | 28.71 | 48.76 | 12.47 | 10.70 |
| Very Good | 8.15 | 17.59 | 30.19 | 47.65 | 8.35 | 8.99 |
| Good | 13.73 | 17.02 | 43.66 | 41.04 | 16.85 | 10.62 |
| Fair | 11.43 | 22.99 | 36.20 | 46.17 | 18.24 | 14.42 |
| Poor | 8.12 | 22.31 | 33.20 | 34.55 | 27.81 | 12.73 |

| | Percentage Who Help with Basic Care[a] | | Percentage Who Help with Chores and Errands[a] | | Percentage Who Provide Financial Help[b] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Working* | *Retired* | *Working* | *Retired* | *Working* | *Retired* |
| **Has Any Siblings** | 10.12 | 20.27 | 33.31 | 44.07 | 11.90 | 10.79 |
| **Parental Living Arrangements** | | | | | | |
| ***Mother*** | | | | | | |
| Coreside with Respondent | 25.77 | 44.87 | 70.35 | 75.12 | 30.07 | 17.96 |
| Within 10 Miles from Respondent | 11.34 | 19.66 | 47.55 | 57.03 | 11.57 | 13.32 |
| More Than 10 Miles from Respondent | 8.76 | 16.48 | 25.11 | 30.74 | 13.93 | 10.75 |
| ***Father*** | | | | | | |
| Coreside with Respondent | 26.02 | 39.03 | 85.37 | 66.34 | 6.40 | 20.79 |
| Within 10 Miles from Respondent | 10.83 | 6.25 | 43.99 | 42.00 | 5.55 | 4.25 |
| More Than 10 Miles from Respondent | 6.27 | 18.80 | 17.87 | 39.98 | 10.69 | 4.08 |
| **Mother Needs Help with Care** | 38.11 | 35.83 | 46.04 | 45.97 | 19.19 | 12.48 |
| **Father Needs Help with Care** | 28.92 | 41.35 | 50.51 | 52.20 | 12.83 | -- |
| **Mother Cannot Be Left Alone** | 35.03 | 31.10 | 42.10 | 41.32 | 19.13 | 13.16 |
| **Father Cannot Be Left Alone** | 15.69 | 27.06 | 36.07 | 22.97 | 14.47 | -- |
| **Parent's Financial Situation** | | | | | | |
| ***Mother*** | | | | | | |
| Better Than Respondent's | 9.83 | 12.60 | 34.51 | 45.38 | 5.54 | 19.72 |
| Worse Than Respondent's | 13.49 | 18.36 | 39.77 | 39.99 | 31.59 | 1.94 |
| ***Father*** | | | | | | |
| Better Than Respondent's | 4.93 | 27.02 | 23.60 | 69.15 | 4.31 | 26.37 |
| Worse Than Respondent's | 5.31 | 33.83 | 31.15 | 39.64 | 28.39 | 3.98 |

a. Includes time assistance of at least 100 hours in the past 12 months.
b. Includes only financial assistance of at least $500 in the past 12 months.
Note: Estimates are weighted to reflect the over sampling of blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents in the HRS.

## TABLE 4: TIME ASSISTANCE AND FINANCIAL TRANSFER FROM MEN TO PARENTS, BY WORK STATUS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

| | Percentage Who Help with Basic Care[a] | | Percentage Who Help with Chores and Errands[a] | | Percentage Who Provide Financial Help[b] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Working* | *Retired* | *Working* | *Retired* | *Working* | *Retired* |
| **Age** | | | | | | |
| 45 – 54 | 9.05 | 14.15 | 28.72 | 34.48 | 12.28 | 18.16 |
| 55 – 64 | 11.97 | 11.41 | 32.29 | 37.30 | 13.42 | 14.50 |
| 65 – 74 | 7.03 | 13.56 | 33.97 | 35.62 | 11.81 | 11.59 |
| 75 – 84 | 9.20 | 16.89 | 36.86 | 37.11 | 19.69 | 14.15 |
| **Race** | | | | | | |
| White | 9.20 | 12.80 | 31.28 | 36.97 | 11.19 | 13.11 |
| Black | 9.17 | 10.99 | 30.33 | 35.02 | 26.43 | 17.43 |
| Other Race | 3.58 | 17.66 | 21.57 | 19.26 | 32.01 | 8.07 |
| Hispanic | 8.16 | 7.44 | 29.15 | 22.85 | 16.63 | 14.60 |
| **Marital Status** | | | | | | |
| Currently Married | 9.65 | 12.64 | 31.06 | 35.68 | 13.23 | 12.19 |
| Separated or Divorced | 6.36 | 16.21 | 32.17 | 42.35 | 11.38 | 19.29 |
| Widower | 8.08 | 16.94 | 14.51 | 32.87 | 2.62 | 24.61 |
| Never married | 5.25 | 3.40 | 27.70 | 42.17 | 11.98 | 17.31 |
| **Education** | | | | | | |
| Attended High School But Did Not Graduate | 8.70 | 7.50 | 27.24 | 28.16 | 11.61 | 7.14 |
| High School Graduate | 10.37 | 10.87 | 32.91 | 33.49 | 11.64 | 11.37 |
| Attended Fewer than Four Years of College | 11.98 | 13.69 | 36.96 | 42.71 | 14.02 | 16.88 |
| College Graduate and Beyond | 5.97 | 18.86 | 26.69 | 41.17 | 13.43 | 17.55 |
| **Health Status** | | | | | | |
| Excellent | 7.27 | 13.48 | 30.05 | 33.24 | 11.28 | 15.31 |
| Very Good | 8.26 | 10.66 | 30.52 | 38.89 | 13.63 | 18.36 |
| Good | 11.09 | 14.43 | 31.83 | 40.56 | 12.96 | 10.73 |
| Fair | 9.84 | 10.82 | 30.70 | 30.24 | 13.82 | 12.16 |
| Poor | 6.89 | 17.12 | 41.25 | 29.46 | 13.44 | 6.83 |

| | Percentage Who Help with Basic Care[a] | | Percentage Who Help with Chores and Errands[a] | | Percentage Who Provide Financial Help[b] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ***Working*** | ***Retired*** | ***Working*** | ***Retired*** | ***Working*** | ***Retired*** |
| **Has Any Siblings** | 8.83 | 12.67 | 30.50 | 35.95 | 12.65 | 12.39 |
| **Parental Living Arrangements** | | | | | | |
| ***Mother*** | | | | | | |
| Coreside with Respondent | 30.31 | 31.76 | 77.50 | 73.49 | 27.57 | 20.61 |
| Within 10 Miles from Respondent | 11.80 | 16.02 | 45.48 | 54.42 | 10.62 | 14.29 |
| More Than 10 Miles from Respondent | 7.53 | 8.89 | 22.64 | 23.24 | 14.94 | 13.10 |
| ***Father*** | | | | | | |
| Coreside with Respondent | 27.30 | 36.98 | 70.15 | 66.33 | 35.94 | -- |
| Within 10 Miles from Respondent | 6.46 | 9.60 | 38.52 | 43.73 | 8.97 | 4.25 |
| More Than 10 Miles from Respondent | 4.34 | 11.83 | 17.35 | 24.50 | 11.18 | 8.31 |
| **Mother Needs Help with Care** | 38.40 | 31.78 | 50.28 | 45.44 | 26.33 | 19.22 |
| **Father Needs Help with Care** | 9.95 | 30.99 | 38.84 | 51.38 | 11.77 | 5.39 |
| **Mother Cannot Be Left Alone** | 29.73 | 31.38 | 40.74 | 36.44 | 20.14 | 16.78 |
| **Father Cannot Be Left Alone** | 6.57 | 31.96 | 27.96 | 37.50 | 15.29 | 12.98 |
| **Parent's Financial Situation** | | | | | | |
| ***Mother*** | | | | | | |
| Better Than Respondent's | 8.03 | 17.33 | 35.93 | 41.86 | 5.24 | 9.18 |
| Worse Than Respondent's | 12.81 | 11.48 | 34.30 | 29.73 | 25.18 | 27.27 |
| ***Father*** | | | | | | |
| Better Than Respondent's | 1.13 | 15.98 | 22.78 | 32.15 | 5.31 | 7.72 |
| Worse Than Respondent's | 6.37 | -- | 32.57 | 25.42 | 23.40 | 35.30 |

a. Includes time assistance of at least 100 hours in the past 12 months.
b. Includes only financial assistance of at least $500 in the past 12 months.
Note: Estimates are weighted to reflect the over sampling of blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents in the HRS.