Gender segregation regimes and the division of household labor

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Abstract

We examine the effect of wives' employment on the division of housework in countries with different types of state policy toward women's employment. Using Chang's (2000) gender segregation regime typology, we test the impact of wives' employment and earnings on the division of housework in married couples, using data for 10 industrialized countries from the 1994 International Social Survey Programme. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the substantive-egalitarian regimes (e.g., Sweden) have the most egalitarian divisions of household labor, while traditional family-centered regimes (e.g., Japan) are the least egalitarian. Further, we confirm that wives' employment has the strongest effect in formal-egalitarian regimes (e.g., U.S.), where the prevailing gender logic treats women as individual workers, and their position in gendered family negotiations depends on worker status. Contrary to our expectations, however, wives' relative earnings have a very strong effect on housework in traditional family-centered countries, especially Japan. This suggests the need for finer distinctions among countries in this category.

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Scholars have argued that there are ideological differences in states' public policies with respect to women's roles in both the labor market and family(Lewis 1992; O'Conner, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk 2002). Such differences in the "gender logics" (Chang 2000) of public policies surrounding women's employment -- including parental leave, child care provision, and equal-opportunity enforcement -- may influence the division of housework. This study examines the effect of wives' employment and earnings relative to their husbands on the division of housework in countries with different types of gender segregation regimes. Using Chang's (2000) typology -- economy-centered (e.g., Hungary), substantive-egalitarian (e.g., Sweden), formal-egalitarian (e.g., United States) and traditional family-centered (e.g., Japan) -- we test whether different state approaches to gender segregation mediate the impact of women's employment and relative earnings on the division of housework between husbands and wives.

Segregation regimes and housework

Recent research has used variation across countries in the household division of labor to better understand how macro-level economic, political and cultural factors affect gendered interactions and inequalities for individual men and women. Despite limitations in the availability of relevant cross-national data, we have established some important starting points. First, although wives perform the dominant share of housework in every developed country studied, there is considerable variation in the gender division of housework, with Japanese husbands sharing housework the least and husbands in the U.S. and Norway contributing most

(Batalova and Cohen 2002). Second, recognizing the theoretical benefits of identifying contextual mechanisms for micro-level inequalities, researchers have tested for associations between such variation and women's overall empowerment (Fuwa 2003), the level of economic development (Sanchez 1994), prevalent gender norms (Dirfenbach 2002; Rodman 1967), and the rate of premarital cohabitation (Batalova & Cohen 2002).

These recent studies have emphasized cross-national differences in structural and cultural conditions, but another key difference between countries -- the role of the state -- has received less attention. This study conceptualizes states as active agents in creating and reinforcing certain social conditions and gender norms. Although Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology of Western capitalist social welfare regimes -- conservative, social-democratic, and liberal -- has been successful in explaining class-based stratification (Chang 2000), feminist scholars have argued for a systematic typology of state policy and its effects on the gender division of labor (Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993; Quadangno 1988). Thus, while Esping-Andersen (1990) links state and market, feminist scholars argue that the study of state policies should focus on the family and its links to women's employment (Orloff 1993; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk 2002).

Public policies may modify the effect of wives' employment and earnings on the division of housework not only by altering the material conditions surrounding couples, but also by supporting or undermining social norms about men and women's roles. With regard to the gender division of housework, the most direct link to state policies might be through parental leave, which varies considerably across developed countries. For example, on one extreme, as of 1996 British parents did not have any nationally recognized parental leave. On the other extreme, maternity/parental leave in Norway offers 80% wage compensation for 52 weeks, or 100% for 42 weeks. Norway also shows a rare case of state intervention in redistributing childcare

responsibility to fathers, with a "father's quota" that reserves four weeks of parental leave exclusively for fathers -- a policy that led to dramatic increases in the rate at which fathers took parental leave (Bruning and Plantenga 1999). Such policies clearly alter the context in which couples negotiate the division of household labor. For example, Windebank (2001) suggests that the lack of support for child care among British dual-earner couples may have an equalizing effect on the division of domestic and parenting work compared to couples in France, where there is only a moderate level of support for childcare.

Women's access to the labor market

Most comparative studies of social protection focus on income transfer programs such as pensions and unemployment insurance, but how states regulate labor markets may also affect inequality (Esping-Andersen 1999). For example, compared to Germany and France, British employment protection has been minimal, there are fewer law-based regulations, and collective bargaining is less efficacious (Bonoli 2003).

Further, in the study of welfare states and its relation to family, scholars tend to emphasize the devaluation of women's unpaid caring work and public provision -- or "de-familialization" -- of reproductive functions such as child care (Esping-Andersen 1999). However, public policies that facilitate women's equal access to paid labor also affects gender relations (Chang 2000; Orloff 1993). Orloff (1993) suggests that since many women are excluded from paid labor, "commodification -- that is, obtaining a position in the paid labor force -- is in fact potentially emancipatory" for women. In a comparative study of 12 western countries, Stier et al. (2001) find that welfare policies affect not only women's employment continuity during their child-rearing years, but also earnings later in life. Whether this institutional context has effects on the division of labor within couples remains to be seen.

Feminist scholars have distinguished frameworks for labor market regulation according to their underlying ideologies of women and work (Kessler-Harris 1987; Vogel 1993). On the one hand, "equality" policies encourage women's access to jobs and economic security. Liberal countries such as the United States and Canada have implemented anti-discrimination and affirmative action policies since the 1960s (the U.S.) and the 1970s (Canada) (O'Conner et al. 1999). In contrast, conservative countries such as Ireland and Austria not only lack Affirmative Action policies, but also retain discriminatory legislation such as prohibiting women from night work and from working underground (Chang 2000:1674). On the other hand, a "difference" ideology promotes protective policies that presume women's role as mothers and seek to reduce their household burdens, for example by providing support for childcare (Figart and Mutari 1998). Former socialist countries socialized some of women's domestic labor such as childcare provision and communal laundries, but their policy rhetoric often naturalized women's reproductive roles. The former GDR, for instance, allotted the "household day" to catch up on household tasks only to women (Einhorn 1993). However, policies intended to increase access to the labor market in ostensibly gender-neutral ways, such as flexible work policies, may also intensify gender differences. This is apparently the case in Germany, where increased flexibility led to more overtime and weekend employment for men while increasing part-time jobs for women. Further, labor market regulation efforts face contradictory pressures. For example, recent European Union initiatives to lower standard working hours have aimed at saving jobs and lowering unemployment rates (presumably for men), rather than focusing on realizing gender equality through controlling labor supply (Figart and Mutari 1998). Thus both equality and difference policies have drawbacks for women's employment. However, the two approaches may

also alter the context for gender relations between husbands and wives, especially negotiations over the division of labor at home.

Gender logics

In her comparative study of occupational sex segregation, Chang (2000) develops two dimensions of state intervention, which correspond to the "equality" and "difference" paradigms underlying policies with regard to women's employment. *Equality of access* policies promote women's access to occupations. These policies reduce gender inequality in the workplace and encourage women to see themselves as individual workers (or as breadwinners without presumed responsibility for reproductive labor), but do not provide direct support for reproductive labor. On the other hand, *substantive benefits* lighten family burdens, for example by providing childcare. These benefits help women remain employed in the face of family responsibilities, but do not challenge their primary identity as mothers and the gendered family obligations they face.

Accordingly, Chang proposes a typology of four gender segregation regimes by the strength of their commitments to these two policy dimensions: economy-centered (low in equality of access and high in substantive benefits, e.g. Hungary), substantive-egalitarian (high in both equality of access and substantive benefits, e.g. Sweden), formal-egalitarian (high in equality of access and low in substantive benefits, e.g. United States) and traditional family-centered (low in both equality of access and substantive benefits, e.g. Japan). Although segregation regimes do not correspond perfectly with cultural attitudes on the gender division of labor (Treas & Widmer 2000), the "gender logics" of these regimes may contribute to women's understanding of themselves as women, workers, and mothers.

Hypotheses

To examine how the gender logics of state policy mediate the impact of wives' employment and relative earnings on the division of housework, we use Chang's (2000) typology of four gender segregation regimes. We test hypotheses both about the overall household division of labor, and about the effects of women's employment and relative earnings on the division of household labor, across these regimes.

In substantive-egalitarian regimes, government policy displays not only a commitment to gender equality but also substantive support services for working mothers. Although these states have not moved to increase husbands' contributions to reproductive labor (Lewis 1992), they do the most to support women as they integrate paid work and family responsibility with provisions such as state-financed childcare, guaranteed parental leaves, and benefits for part-time workers. Thus we hypothesize:

H_1: Substantive-egalitarian regimes have the most egalitarian division of household labor.

On the other extreme, states in traditional family-centered regimes pay little attention to issues of gender equality, neglecting both formal commitments to gender equality in the labor market and substantive support for employed women. This gender logic regards women as belonging within families as wives and mothers even when they work outside the home. They should have the most traditional division of housework:

H_2: Traditional family-centered regimes have the least egalitarian division of household labor.

Formal-egalitarian regimes have a formal commitment to gender equality in the labor market, which may range from equal pay and anti-discrimination laws to affirmative action and government quotas. At the same time, however, state-sponsored substantive services such as childcare are scarce. The gender logic treats women as individual workers rather than as mothers. Thus, women are expected to manage combining paid and unpaid work without state assistance. The lack of state-provided substantive benefits, in conjunction with high employment rates for women, should lead to a relatively egalitarian division of household labor. However, because the state promotes the ideology of women as individual workers, husbands' contribution to housework may hinge on wives' employment and relative earnings -- requiring wives to negotiate lower housework burdens based on their status as workers. Thus we hypothesize:

H_3: Formal-egalitarian regimes show the strongest effect of wives' employment and relative earnings on the division of housework.

Finally, economy-centered regimes encourage women's full-time employment by providing state-sponsored substantive benefits. However, although these countries had socialist systems that were strongly egalitarian in terms of reducing class-based inequality -- and they heavily promoted women's labor market participation -- beyond that their commitment to gender-based inequality was relatively superficial. Under this paradigm, "employment is seen primarily as a civil responsibility" (Chang 2000:1665) and gender ideologies that presume women's family responsibilities remain unquestioned despite high levels of women's labor force participation. Since there is a wide expectation of women's employment coupled with relevant substantive benefits, the overall division of housework may be relatively egalitarian. However,

women within families are still considered primarily mothers.[1] Similarly, in traditional family-centered regimes, women's family responsibilities are rigidly upheld, with state policy leaving traditional cultural norms unchallenged. In both cases, the division of household labor may be unresponsive to women's employment or level of earnings relative to their husbands. Therefore:

> *H_4: Traditional family-centered and economy-centered regimes will show the weakest effects of wives' employment and relative earnings on the household division of labor.*

With available data, we cannot definitively identify the mechanisms by which state policy affects gendered negotiations in the family. However, we can test whether the basic contours of the household division of labor and its determinants are consistent with the expectations generated by this theory.

Data and Methods

We use data from the 1994 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The data reflect a cross-national collaboration in which independent institutions replicate survey questions in their own countries (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 2002). All of the samples are probability samples (most countries used a stratified multistage random sample.) Although the survey was conducted in 24 countries, we include just 10 for which Chang's (2000) typology has been specified and necessary data are available: Austria, Canada, West Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Our

[1] Panayotova and Brayfield's Panayotova, Evelina and April Brayfield. 1997. "National Context and Gender Ideology: Attitudes Toward Women's Employment in Hungary and the United States." *Gender & Society* 11:627-656. show that, even though Hungarian government pursued a full employment policy under Communist-party rule, Hungarians still are unsupportive toward women's employment, compared to Americans. Further, the association between women's employment status and their supportive attitudes toward employment is weaker for Hungarian than for American counterparts.

sample includes only married respondents who are at least 18 years old. After excluding cases that are missing data on key variables, this study uses 6,926 cases. Sample sizes range from 388 (Ireland) to 1059(West Germany).

The dependent variable is the *division of housework* between husband and wife, including only those tasks considered "female tasks" (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Baxter 1997; Blair and Lichter 1991). The ISSP data include variables reflecting the relative contribution of husband and wife to four household tasks: laundry, shopping for groceries, caring for sick family members, and deciding what to have for dinner. In the questionnaire, respondents are asked who usually does these tasks. Each variable takes on values of: 5 (the wife always does the task), 4 (the wife usually does), 3 (about equal), 2 (the husband usually does) and 1 (the husband always does the task). The responses to the four questions are summed and divided by the number of complete responses to these questions. This housework index is used by Batalova and Cohen (2002) and Fuwa (2003). Scores greater than 3.0 on the dependent variable indicate that wives perform more housework than husbands.

In order to measure differential effects of wives' employment on the division of housework, we use a dummy variable for *wife full-time*, indicating wife's full time employment status (and also control for *husband's full-time* employment status). Given the lack of information about actual income, wives' *relative income* is derived from the reported income difference between a husband and wife, which was originally scaled from 1 (the husband earns much more) to 5 (the wife earns much more). However, given the extremely skewed distribution of this variable, we dichotomized it to produce a dummy variable indicating those couples in which the husband does *not* earn "much more" than the wife (including those couples in which

only the husband was employed).[2] Because of inconsistencies across the countries we use, there are no more detailed measures of these key concepts that would be comparable.

We control for a number of known covariates of the gender division of housework. G*ender role attitude* reflects how respondents think about the appropriate roles for men and women, measured by the response to these statements: "A job is all right but what most women really want is home and children," "Being housewife is a just as fulfilling as working for pay," "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family," and "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job." The responses are measured in 5-point scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), with higher score reflecting more egalitarian attitudes. The responses to the four statements are summed and divided by the number of complete responses to these questions.

We control for *age* of respondents in years, and *age squared*. *Educational attainment* is a dummy variable that indicates whether the respondent has some four-year college experience (coded 1) or not (coded 0) -- more detail is not possible across all countries.[3] We are forced to identify those respondents who *ever had a child* indirectly, from a question about the presence of children: "Did you work outside the home when a child was under school age?" Respondents who answered "yes" or "no" are coded 1 (ever had a child); respondents coded "does not apply (no children)" are coded 0. Although this measure is imprecise its strong effect on the division of housework justifies its inclusion in the models. Since a positive effect of cohabitation experience

[2] We experimented with dichotomizing this variable at different cut-points. The results were not substantively different, but this coding produced the best fitting models.

[3] There appears to be an error in the ISSP's recoding of the educational attainment variable for Canada, which shows a much higher percentage of college graduates than are reported by official statistics (see http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/educ42.htm, accessed March 2, 2004). At the same time, an additional variable for years of education completed is not included for Canada, preventing a cross-check with the educational attainment variable. Thus, in the case of Canada

on the more egalitarian division of housework has been found previously (Batalova and Cohen 2002), we control for *cohabitation experience*. Respondents who cohabited (with anyone) before they married are coded 1 and those who did not cohabit are coded 0. Finally, because we include data from both male and female respondents, but only one respondent per married couple, we control for the gender of the respondent with a dummy variable indicating *male*, to capture possible bias in reporting by either men or women (Batalova & Cohen 2002).

Using Chang's (2000) coding scheme, the 10 countries are classified into four social gender segregation regimes: formal-egalitarian (the United States and Canada), substantive-egalitarian (Sweden and Norway), traditional family centered (Austria, West Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Japan), and economy centered (Hungary).

We use ordinary least-squares regressions, with interaction terms to test the effects of wives' employment across gender segregation regimes. The main effects for wives' employment and relative income reflect values for traditional family-centered countries (the reference category), and the interaction terms test for differences between that effect and the effects in formal-egalitarian, economy-centered and substantive-egalitarian regimes. To account for the clustering of couples within the 10 countries, we use Stata's cluster regression option.

Results

Table 1 shows the means of each variable for each country, and for the countries grouped by segregation regime type. The means for the dependent variable, division of household labor, are presented in Figure 1 (remember that higher scores equal less egalitarian divisions of household labor, on a scale of 1 to 5, with 3 representing equality). Consistent with our hypotheses, the traditional family-centered regimes show the least egalitarian division of

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we code only those with the highest level of education as having some college, which produces a

household labor. However, although we predicted that the substantive-egalitarian regimes (Norway and Sweden) would have the *most* egalitarian division of household labor, the bivariate results show no difference between these and the formal-egalitarian regimes (U.S. and Canada). Note also that the traditional family-centered regimes differ considerably on the dependent variable, ranging from 3.9 in New Zealand to 4.5 in Japan.

Table 1 also shows that, as expected, the traditional family-centered regimes uniformly have the lowest percentage of couples with wives fully employed, while the formal- and substantive-egalitarian countries have slightly higher employment rates for wives than the economy-centered Hungary. Similarly, the traditional family-centered regimes show the greatest economic dependence of wives on husbands, with the lowest scores for wives' relative incomes (except for New Zealand).

The results from the regression models are presented in Table 2. Model 1 shows coefficients for the primary couple-level variables -- wives' employment and relative earnings -- along with the couple-level control variables. These results are consistent with those found in previous studies (Batalova & Cohen 2002; Fuwa 2003). Model 2 adds dummy variables indicating gender segregation regimes, with traditional family-centered regimes as the excluded category. Model 3 adds interactions between wives' employment, relative earnings and regime types. The interaction terms show how the effects of wives' employment and relative earnings differ in each of the three other regime types.

The second model shows that a relatively small percentage of the difference in the household division of labor between regime types is accounted for by the extensive couple-level variables in the models. Comparing the differences in unadjusted means from Table 1 with the coefficients in Model 2 of Table 2 shows that the couple-level variables account for the largest

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rate closer to that reported for those with some college education by Statistics Canada.

portion of the difference between the substantive-egalitarian regimes and the traditional family-centered regimes (34%), followed by the difference between formal-egalitarian regimes and traditional family-centered regimes (24%), with a very small portion of the difference between economy-centered Hungary and traditional family-centered regimes accounted for by these variables (7%). Thus, most of the difference in the household division of labor across regime types does not result from variation in the women's employment and relative earnings, age structure, access to education, the presence of children, cohabitation history or respondents' gender ideology. The results from Model 2 are consistent with the unadjusted means with regard to the overall division of housework across segregation regimes. Thus, our first two hypotheses are largely confirmed, with substantive-egalitarian regimes having the most egalitarian division of household labor (except only equal to the formal-egalitarian regimes) and traditional family-centered regimes being the least egalitarian.

Model 3 shows the tests for interactions between regime type and wives' employment and relative earnings -- tests for differences in the mechanisms by which gender inequality within the family operate across regimes. To facilitate interpretation, the effects of wives' employment and relative earnings for each regime type are shown in Figure 2, calculated from Model 3.

We are now in a position to evaluate the final hypotheses. The predictions and findings for all four hypotheses are summarized in Table 3. As noted, the first two hypotheses are confirmed, with or without control variables, except that the formal -egalitarian regimes are not less egalitarian in their housework division of labor than the substantive-egalitarian regimes. With regard to the effects of wives' employment and earnings relative to their husbands, our hypotheses are confirmed except for the effect of earnings in traditional family-centered regimes. Our prediction was that these countries would show the weakest effect of earnings, but instead

the effect is strongest there. Closer examination shows that this result is driven in large part by the extremely strong effect of wives' relative earnings in Japan. In addition, Japan has the greatest proportion of couples in which the husband earns "much more" than the wife (82%), compared to 66% for other countries in the traditional family-centered group and lower proportions in the other regimes. However, even with Japan removed from the analysis, the effect of earnings in traditional family-centered regime countries is as strong as it is in formal- and substantive-egalitarian regimes (results available from the authors).

Conclusions

This study examines the effects of gender segregation regime type on the dynamics of the division of housework between husbands and wives. Using Chang's (2000) typology, we proposed that gender segregation regimes influence social conditions and gender ideologies about women's roles, and thus modify the effect of women's employment and relative earnings on the division of housework. Although feminist scholars have argued for analyzing states regard to unpaid domestic labor, little research has focused on the relationship between the various regimes and the division of housework. Focusing on gender segregation regimes -- rather than social welfare regimes more narrowly -- this analysis begins to address that problem.

We find that the substantive-egalitarian regimes (Sweden and Norway) are clustered together with the formal-egalitarian regimes (United States and Canada) at the egalitarian end of the household labor distribution, as has been reported elsewhere (Batalova & Cohen 2002). Traditional-family centered regimes have the least egalitarian division of housework, although there are considerable country differences within the regimes on the average division of housework. Japan is a particular outlier, which exhibits an extreme traditional division of housework. Since Japan is the only country from Asia in the data set, cultural and historical

differences may have affected the mechanisms of the household labor distribution differently from other western countries (Kamo 1994).

With regard to the effects of women's employment on different regimes, our predictions are largely supported. The effect of women's employment is largest in formal-egalitarian regimes although the effect is not significantly different from substantive-egalitarian regimes. Absence of public support for domestic labor in formal-egalitarian regimes (Windebank 2001) and a conception of women as individual workers rather than mothers with presumed household responsibility, may have facilitated a more egalitarian division of housework. Perhaps, too, women's higher employment rates in these countries offer wives more plausible alternatives to marriage during negotiations over the division of housework.

Interestingly, we find that the effect of women's employment in economy-centered regime is positive, and women's relative earnings have no effect on the division of housework. Although attitudes toward women's employment in Hungary -- our sole representative of this regime -- are less supportive than Americans (Panayotova and Brayfield 1997), the1994 data set might also have captured a reactionary swing toward traditional gender ideology in the aftermath of the fall of socialist system. Peterson and Runyan (1999) report that the percentage of women in the national parliament dropped to 7 percent in 1994 from an average of 29 percent in the mid-1980s.

Contrary to our hypothesis, the effect of relative earnings is the strongest in traditional family-centered regimes, followed by formal-egalitarian regimes. As noted above, the strong effect of traditional family-centered regimes is largely driven by Japan's strong coefficient. However, even when Japan is excluded, the effect is as strong as that of formal-egalitarian regimes. We may speculate that since there is only small percentage of women in traditional

family-centered regime whose husbands do not earn much more, these wives may think their situation as special (Treas and Widmer 2000) and demand greater contributions from their husbands (although why these wives are able to garner such power in their relations needs to be investigated).

Consistent with our prediction, substantive-egalitarian regimes shows only moderate effect of relative earnings. Further, as in the case of economy-centered regime, material and financial support for childcare without gender egalitarian logics may erase the effect of women's employment and relative earnings on a more egalitarian division of housework. These findings suggest the significance of social policies' gender logics in the negotiation of the division of housework between husbands and wives.

While regime typologies based on countries' social policies are useful theoretically and for policy implications, lumping countries of diverse cultures together also risks losing important distinctions in their social policies. For instance, although New Zealand is classified as traditional family-centered regime in Chang's (2000) typology, it is rather a boarder country between traditional family and formal egalitarian regimes, and New Zealand's response to women's full-time employment is among the strongest, which is expected for formal egalitarian regimes. Some contradictory findings suggest that our model may not be fine enough to differentiate all the issues we are investigating. Future study should look into these differences and refine measures of classification both qualitatively and quantitatively.

NOTES

1. Chang's (2000) classification scheme is composed with two areas: substantive benefits and equality of occupational access. Induces of substantive benefits are the '(1) the existence and length of maternity and parental leave and (2) the availability and accessibility of public daycare

programs and government efforts to expand daycare'(1671) (Data derived from Wilensky 1990, 2000). Induces of equal access are '(1) the presence of affirmative action policies (2) the ratification of ILO Convention III prohibiting discrimination against women in employment and occupation, (3) the ratification of the UNCEDAW, (4) the absence of ratification of ILO Convention 89 prohibiting women from nightwork, (5) the absence of ratification of ILO Convention 45 prohibiting women from working underground, and (6) the absence of legislation restricting the manual transport of heavy loads by women'(1672)

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, by Country and Regime Type

Country/regime	*N*	*Division of labor*	*Wife full-time*	*Relative earnings* [a]	*Husband full-time*	*Gender ideology*	*Age*	*Child*	*Cohabited*	*College*	*Male*
United States	575	3.72	0.53	0.38	0.84	2.17	42.53	0.85	0.33	0.40	0.45
Canada	668	3.74	0.47	0.40	0.86	2.45	41.97	0.84	0.32	0.23	0.33
Formal-Egalitarian	1,243	3.73	0.49	0.39	0.85	2.32	42.23	0.84	0.33	0.30	0.39
Norway	1,013	3.73	0.65	0.43	0.81	2.24	45.54	0.86	0.45	0.30	0.45
Sweden	613	3.74	0.32	0.53	0.69	2.26	49.36	0.87	0.59	0.24	0.48
Substantive-Egalitarian	1,626	3.73	0.53	0.47	0.77	2.25	46.98	0.86	0.50	0.28	0.46
New Zealand	543	3.88	0.31	0.41	0.80	2.19	45.17	0.84	0.29	0.50	0.42
West Germany	1,059	3.95	0.27	0.22	0.94	2.01	42.41	0.79	0.44	0.16	0.54
Austria	455	4.11	0.28	0.31	0.78	1.68	46.35	0.90	0.49	0.05	0.45
Ireland	388	4.14	0.30	0.26	0.88	1.99	43.28	0.89	0.13	0.18	0.45
Japan	769	4.49	0.31	0.16	0.88	1.71	47.08	0.84	0.08	0.25	0.45
Traditional Family-Centered	3,214	4.11	0.29	0.25	0.87	1.92	44.66	0.84	0.30	0.22	0.48
Hungary	843	3.94	0.45	0.57	0.60	1.25	46.75	0.90	0.17	0.14	0.50
Economy-Centered	843	3.94	0.45	0.57	0.60	1.25	46.75	0.90	0.17	0.14	0.50

[a] Husband does not earn "much more" than wife.

Table 2. Robust regression coefficients for household division of labor on couple and welfare regime variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Couple variables			
Wife employed full time	-.164 ***	-.119 ***	-.090 **
Relative earnings[a]	-.159 *	-.139 **	-.231 **
Husband employed full time	.181 ***	.151 ***	.136 ***
Gender ideology	-.121 ***	-.106 ***	-.105 ***
Age	.028 ***	.025 ***	.025 ***
Age squared	-.0002 ***	-.0002 **	-.0002 ***
Ever had a child	.068 +	.092 *	.089 *
Ever cohabited	-.167 *	-.142 *	-.139 *
Some college or more	-.088 *	-.075 +	-.073 +
Male respondent	-.178 ***	-.188 ***	-.188 ***
Regime type			
Traditional family-centered (excluded)	--		
Formal-egalitarian	--	-.291 *	-.278 *
Substantive-egalitarian	--	-.250 *	-.274 *
Economy-centered	--	-.162 +	-.329 *
*Regime*couple interactions*			
Formal-egalitarian*relative earnings	--		.087
Substantive-egalitarian*relative earnings	--		.134 +
Economy-centered*relative earnings	--		.229 **
Formal-egalitarian*wife employed full time	--		-.084 *
Substantive-egalitarian*wife employed full time	--		-.055 *
Economy-centered*wife employed full time	--		.124 ***
Intercept	3.550 ***	3.665 ***	3.698 ***
R-squared	.175	.212	.217

[a] Husband does not earn "much more" than wife.

Table 3. Predictions and findings

	Prediction	Finding
Division of labor		
H_1: Most egalitarian	Substantive-egalitarian	Substantive-egalitarian and formal-egalitarian
H_2: Least egalitarian	Traditional family-centered	Confirmed
Effect of employment/earnings		
H_3: Strongest effect		
Employment	Formal-egalitarian	Confirmed
Earnings	Formal-egalitarian	Traditional family-centered
H_4: Weakest effect		
Employment	Traditional family-centered and economy-centered	Confirmed
Earnings	Traditional family-centered and economy-centered	Economy-centered

Figure 1. Gender Division of Household Labor, by Social Welfare Regime
(Scale from 1 to 5, >3=Wife does more)



Note: Regime means are statistically significant ($p < .001$), except for formal-egalitarian versus substantive-egalitarian.

Figure 2. Effect of Wives' Employment and Earnings on Household Division of Labor, by Regime Type (with controls)