# Second Generation Internal Migration: Dispersion from States of Immigration?

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Spatial assimilation theory has held enough sway in the immigration literature for at least half a century to institutionalize the very ways we think about immigration. The formulaic representation of immigrants who initially reside in concentrated locations of co-ethnics and disperse as they integrate into "American" social space has yielded expectations on where immigrants should reside with regard to white "natives," as if that were some singularly "American" reference group with singularly "American" residential patterns unmarked by earlier immigration experience, or by histories of race, class and their making in place (Wright and Ellis 2000). In the sense that theory creates normative expectations, spatial assimilation ideas lead to jeremiads about immigrants whose mobility and residence don't follow theorized expectations. Finally, the strength of spatial assimilation theory is such that it renders invisible justification for dozens of inquiries into "where immigrants are going" and predictions of concentration or dispersion on a variety of scales, on the unclarified premise that it is necessary to know such things (e.g.; Bartel 1989, Kritz and Nogle 1994).

As large numbers of the children of the post-1965 immigrants enter adulthood (and become identifiable in census data) there is a flurry of research dedicated to answering whether they will assimilate into the mainstream American middle-class or experience little or no mobility beyond that of their parents. Despite early prognoses of second generation decline into an urban underclass (Gans 1992, Massey 1995, Portes and Zhou 1995), more recent investigations have cautiously assessed the probability that the second generation will surpass the educational and occupational attainments of their parents (Hirschman 2001, Zhou 2001, Farley and Alba 2002). Such assessments note the complications of race and nativity, however, stressing that intergenerational progress will be slower for some racial and nativity groups than others. In so doing, there is continuing reference to segmented assimilation

hypotheses with their claim that immigrant adaptation is contingent upon race and context of settlement (Rosenbaum and Friedman 2001). However, with the exception of Zhou's (2001), findings that second generation occupational and educational progress depends on location among five U.S. immigrant cities there has been little empirical consideration of the ways in which location might matter for the children of immigrants.

This is doubly curious given the historical preoccupation of immigration research with immigrants' mobility and settlement patterns, and the focus on the role of distinctive ethnic communities in immigrant assimilation. It seems that interrogation of the spatial assimilation of the second generation would be of interest in two regards. First, the idea that immigrant residential integration with the native population is a measure of their assimilation has been a continuing focus in immigration research (Massey 1985; Massey and Denton 1988; Alba, Logan, and Crowder 1997; Alba, Logan et al 1999), one that could be usefully applied to understanding the residential location prospects for the children of immigrants. Second, concern at a regional level with the territorial politics of immigrant mobility and settlement would seem to necessitate questions of where the second generation live as well. In this paper, we explore the interstate mobility of the second generation from a perspective that is sensitive to the failings and biases of spatial assimilation theory (cf. Wright, Ellis and Parks 2003) . In the conclusions we reflect on our findings to suggest a rethinking of the dispersion-as-assimilation rationale that is central to spatial assimilation's logic.

**Theoretical Background**

Much interest in immigration studies has thus focused in two main areas: 1) the residential mobility and resulting concentration or dispersion of the foreign-born population,

and 2) the socioeconomic mobility and social integration of the foreign-born. These two concerns have been considered inextricably linked via theories of spatial assimilation (DeWind and Kasinitz 1997). Thus, the concern of immigration theorists has often been one of where immigrants are locating, and how this is related to the process of integration. To this end, researchers have demonstrated concern with immigrant concentration in certain key states. Still, little is known about where the second generation reside, their mobility or its determinants, and to what extent they resemble the foreign-born or native-born (at least third generation) in these regards. As the children of the post-1965 immigrants reach adulthood, such questions are critical in examination of ethnic concentrations and immigrant integration. Those most concerned with immigrant progress, after all, have been quite clear that integration is a multi-generational process, especially for national origins groups whose home country background is considered to differ markedly from that of the U.S. (Borjas 1999).

Spatial assimilation theory, as articulated by Massey(1985), posited that as immigrants experienced cultural adaptation and gained socioeconomic status they would move from highly-concentrated central city locations to less ethnically-isolated suburbs. As a result of this move, they would experience further acculturation and provide opportunities for structural assimilation for their children, mainly through proximity to the native-born. In this classical articulation, spatial assimilation is very much a local process. We suggest, however, that spatial assimilation has informed research on immigrant mobility and settlement on other scales. This is apparent with regard to much of the research on ethnic enclaves, which of empirical necessity often compares metropolitan areas rather than neighborhoods within them. Its influence is also palpable in studies that compare immigrant cities or states with non-concentrated places. It is also, more alarmingly and persistently, evident in public discussion

of the problems of immigrant concentration in several key states and metropolitan areas (see, for example, Kennedy 1996).

Nevertheless, critiques of spatial assimilation from segmented assimilation perspectives note spatial assimilation theory's failure to explain the reasons why some groups fail to disperse. Such perspectives invariably hit upon the socio-spatial constraints that make it impossible for those at the bottom of the racial hierarchy to translate socioeconomic gains into less segregated housing outcomes (see, for example, Alba, Logan, and Leung (1994) and Rosenbaum and Friedman(2001)). Although these studies focus on locational attainment and the role of discriminatory mechanisms within urban areas, it seems apparent that racial hierarchies operate at multiple scales, such that both residential and labor markets provide differently racialized opportunities and constraints across as well as within urban areas. Critiques of the failures of spatial assimilation theory are critically concerned with the ways in which residential outcomes are contingent upon race and other factors. We suggest that these processes operate at multiple and intersecting scales.

Our regional perspective on the spatial assimilation of the children of immigrants owes much to Lieberson and Waters' work on the location of racial and ethnic groups in the United States(1987). This is both because of our interest in migration at a regional (in our case, inter-state) scale, and also because Lieberson and Waters suggest that ethnic groups have differing propensities to leave or remain in certain areas, and that these propensities are driven by the ethnic composition of these areas. Similarly, we suggest that immigrant concentration at origin has much to do with the migration propensities of immigrants and their children. Finally, Lieberson and Waters presage important aspects of segmented assimilation approaches, in that

they suggest the contingency of this process on the historical contexts of incorporation by race and economic factors, as well as the probable persistence of ethnic concentration.

Although evidence has been found that inter-state migration of immigrants declines with increasing ethnic concentration at origin (Kritz and Nogle 1994), this relationship should (conceptually) diminish for the children of immigrants. Spatial assimilation theory would hold that the second generation should disperse from first generation sites of concentrated ethnic settlement. Whether U.S.-born children of immigrants, or simply immigrants who arrived as young children, they should have considerably more experience in the U.S. and exposure to a U.S. educational system than the foreign-born who arrive when older. For this reason, spatial assimilation theory would hold that the second generation should be less concentrated than the foreign-born population, as they have less need of social capital abundantly found in ethnic concentrations. Alternatively, spatially-segmented assimilation may occur, in which the persistent racialization of certain immigrant groups continues to play an important part in determining the mobility and residence of immigrants and their children.

We suggest that research on immigrant integration and ethnic clustering must be more multifaceted than it has been in the past. Part of this argument is due to the increasing presence of the adult children of immigrants, who doubtless contribute to the ethnic geography of the U.S. and render discussions of ethnic concentrations more complex than a simple tallying of the foreign-born in fixed locations. In doing so, they also reintroduce questions of why and how theories of spatial assimilation guide immigration/migration research. Why is it expected that the second generation will disperse and become less ethnically-concentrated than their parents? To the extent that they do not what do immigrant concentrations (and study of them) mean? Are social and spatial mobility connected in the same ways we have previously

assumed? Knowledge of the residential and mobility patterns of the second generation, relative to those of the native-born and foreign-born, are of critical concern in answering these questions. Models of the determinants of this mobility that consider interactions of race/ethnicity and concentration with nativity status contribute to a more in-depth understanding of linkages between social and spatial integration.

**Preliminary Analysis**

With this in mind, scenarios of second generation success predicated on dispersion away from immigrant concentrations are called into question. The analysis of second generation migration proper is limited to the use of CPS data and we make use of this source for some preliminary descriptive exploration of distributions and migration trends. To start, we examine state variation in foreign-born and second generation population shares (Figure 1). The states are ranked by the sum of these shares (foreign stock share). The distributions of foreign born share and second generation share are highly correlated (r=0.86), which is not surprising given that many of the second generation reside in the homes of their immigrant parents. However, these distributions are the product of distinct and non-overlapping immigrant waves. In states like California the second generation has mushroomed in the last four decades because of immigration to that state in the same time period. In other states, such as the northern plains states, low foreign born shares are paired with fairly high second generation shares reflecting the remnant second generation populations of previous immigration waves.




Next, we examine the raw inter-state one-year mobility rates of immigrant, second generation, and at least third generation native-born adults from a 1998-2002 pooled sample of the CPS.[1] Given the dominance of two large country-of-origin groups, we consider the Mexican and Chinese foreign-stock populations separately as well (Figure 2). Overall, second

[1] Foreign-born and second generation individuals have at least one foreign-born parent. These mobility rates are considerably lower than the 5-year rates from the PUMS data. Individuals in these nativity group comparisons are at least 18 years of age.

generation individuals are less likely to undertake inter-state moves in the period considered than native-born and foreign-born individuals. We are particularly interested, especially given the literature on the negative relationship identified between nativity concentration and internal migration, in the importance of initial residence in a state with a high concentration of immigrants. Figure 2 shows that the foreign-born and the second generation are much more likely to move out of state if their origin state does not have a high concentration of same-origin immigrants.[2]




The children of Mexican immigrants show little difference in interstate migration propensity than their parents and, like them, are less likely to move if living in a concentration of co-nationals. In contrast, the children of Chinese immigrants are considerably more likely to leave an immigrant concentration than their foreign-born parents. However, living in a concentrated state reduces the odds of migration for second generation Chinese by nearly half, a much greater proportional reduction than found for foreign-born Chinese, second-generation

[2] States designated as ethnic concentrations in each case are as follows: CA, HI, NY, NJ, and FL for the foreign-born population generally; CA, AZ, TX, NM, and NV for the Mexican-born population, and CA, HI, NY, MA and MD for the Chinese-born population.

Mexicans and the second generation population as a whole. These ethnic concentration effects on outmigration propensity, coupled with the result that the second generation as a whole is less mobile than both the foreign-born and native-born populations, cast some doubt on simple predictions of dispersion among the adult children of immigrants.

**Models**

We do not use the CPS for our multivariate analysis because sample size limitations limit the inclusion of a full range of covariates and their interactions. Instead, we construct models to compare mobility and its determinants among the native-born, foreign-born, and 1.5 generation children of immigrants using the 2000 5% PUMS. The identification of the 1.5 generation in the PUMS data affords a suitable proxy, with a significantly larger sample size that makes it possible to consider additional covariates such as race, and generates a longer 5-year (rather than 1-year in the CPS) migration question. We differentiate the 1.5-generation population from the remainder of the foreign-born population by age at arrival: following Perlmann and Waldinger (1997) and the work of Ruben Rumbaut we define the 1.5 group as immigrants who enter the U.S. before they were ten years of age. The foreign-born as we define them are thus those immigrants who arrived later in life.

Two sets of models are estimated: an initial set comparing foreign-born and 1.5 generation individuals with foreign-born Hispanics as the reference category, and a second set comparing native-born and 1.5 generation individuals with native-born whites as the reference category. This allows us, in the first instance, to answer questions of mobility and the importance of ethnic concentration therein for the 1.5 generation versus foreign-born Hispanics, the group it seems that much current debate takes as its concern, especially with

regard to questions of spatial assimilation. In the second instance we compare the children of immigrants who arrived as young children with native-born whites, to see whether there exist residual differences between these two populations. This strategy allows us to measure as clearly as possible differences between the migration behavior of the 1.5 generation and a reference group that is either foreign born or native-born. We rejected an alternative modeling strategy that lumps all three groups into one model because this procedure allows only one reference group and greatly increases the number of interactions in a single model, substantially complicating interpretation. For all models, the sample includes heads of household at least 23 years of age in 2000 (18 at the start of the risk period for a move), who are not on active-duty military service or living in group quarters. The dependent variable in both sets of models is whether or not an individual made an inter-state move between 1995 and 2000.

Each set of models is a sequence of seven logit specifications that add specific groups of covariates and their interactions. All specifications include covariates measuring race (coded Hispanic, white, black, Asian, and other)[3], age (in decadal cohorts), completed education,[4] number of persons in the family, and dummy indicators for marital status, gender, and self-employment. We chose race and ethnic categories rather than national origin to differentiate groups for two reasons. First, racial and ethnic categories allow us to group diverse national origin populations that concentrate in particular states into a small number of standardized groups. Of course this standardization glosses over considerable national origin variability within racial and ethnic categories. However, our second rationale addresses this concern:

[3] All races are single-race reported only, while other includes those not fitting any of the other reported categories or reporting multiple races. Hispanics are anyone responding to the Hispanic ethnicity variable.
[4] Less than high school, high school diploma or GED, some college, or at least a bachelor's degree are the four categories here.

immigrant children slot into America's ethnic and racial hierarchy so that their identity and their labeling by others will be partly captured by these racial and ethnic groupings.

Note that cohort of arrival is not one of our covariates because it generated substantial co-linearity problems in the 1.5 generation sample. In essence, the cohort variable made little sense for this group because the sample's age requirements excludes the possibility that any of them will be in many of the recent arrival cohorts: all members of the 1.5 generation in the 2000 Census arrived before 1987, most before 1980. Overall, the inclusion or exclusion of the cohort variable had little effect on the magnitude or significance of the other variables in the models (even when its effect was restricted to immigrants who arrived as adults only). In light of these minimal effects and given the number of other variables and interactions already in our models we opted to exclude the cohort variable.

The first logit specification includes the basic covariates just described. Models 2-7 add an immigrant origin concentration variable, which is a logged continuous measure of the proportion of the origin state that is foreign-born.[5] This concentration variable is interacted with 1.5 generation status in models 3-7 in order to examine the differential effect of concentration on mobility for the 1.5 generation. Model 4 introduces variables for origin state employment growth and unemployment[6] in order to control for origin economic effects that could affect mobility. Models 5-7 include 2-way interactions of race/concentration, education/concentration, and nativity/race, and 3-way interactions of

[5] Values of less than 1% are rounded up in order to prevent negative log values.
[6] State employment growth is averaged over five years from 1990-95 in order to be exogenous to migration. Unemployment is averaged over the five-year period of the study. These variables are mean-centered, and the persons in family variable is centered at 1, so as to facilitate interpretation of coefficients.

nativity/race/concentration as covariates.[7] Descriptive statistics on key covariates for the native born, foreign-born and the 1.5 generation are shown in Table 1.

*Foreign-born/1.5 Generation Models*

Results from the models comparing the 1.5 generation with immigrants who arrived later in life (referred to throughout this section as foreign-born) are reported in Table 2. We show seven logit specifications illustrating the effects of additional main and interaction effects. Our main concern is with the fully specified model 7 and the bulk of our comments refer to the coefficients of this model unless otherwise specified. Although the main effects for 1.5 status in Model 7 indicate greater inter-state mobility by the 1.5 generation, model specification allows for interpretation of this coefficient only at a hypothetical origin concentration of 0. Considerations of origin concentration and its interactions with nativity and race in this full model substantially complicate conclusions of second generation dispersal. Immigrants are less likely to leave states with higher concentrations of the foreign-born. The fact that this is even truer for those immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as very young children calls spatial assimilation into question.

More interestingly, race is an important consideration, one that works differently for 1.5 generation vs. foreign-born individuals, and one that is moderated in turn by concentration. Foreign-born whites, for example are not significantly different from foreign-born Hispanics in their propensity for interstate mobility. In contrast, 1.5 generation whites have extremely low interstate mobility compared with 1.5 generation Hispanics, blacks, and Asians, as indicated by the large negative coefficient for the interaction of white race and 1.5 generation status.

[7] 3-way interactions including education were tested and found to be insignificant and so not included in the final models presented here.

Moreover, the deterrent effects of concentration are significantly abated for 1.5 generation whites, such that origin concentration matters far less in determining this group's mobility.

The negative relationship between concentration and mobility for the foreign-born Hispanic reference group (logcon coefficient) grows stronger for 1.5 generation Hispanics (1.5con coefficient). Thus, Hispanic immigrants who arrive as children are more likely to stay in states of high immigration than are Hispanic immigrants who arrive at older ages. The situation is more complex for other groups. As with Hispanic immigrants, black and Asian immigrants who arrived as adults are less likely to move across state lines if they reside in immigrant concentrations. However, this mitigation effect is much stronger for Asians.

To better illustrate the effects of concentration on foreign-born and 1.5 generation members of different groups we evaluated the probabilities of interstate mobility (Figure 3).




Probabilities were calculated with all values held constant at the reference category or mean, allowing 1.5 generation/foreign-born status, race, and concentration to vary. Thus, these

probabilities are estimated for single, high-school educated, not self-employed men in their thirties.

We can see that living in a state immigrant concentration reduces the propensity to migrate across state lines for all groups. In addition, the 1.5 generation has an extraordinarily high propensity to leave states with extremely low concentrations of immigrants. Indeed, for 1.5 Hispanics, blacks, and Asians (and foreign-born Asians) in origin states that are 1% immigrant, the probabilities of migration are 40-55%. Additionally, we can see that at higher levels of concentration, 1.5 generation Asians and blacks are hardly distinguishable from their foreign-born counterparts in terms of mobility, and 1.5 generation Hispanics actually become less likely to move than foreign-born Hispanics at high levels of concentration.

*Additional considerations: education and employment*

There are some interesting findings derived from consideration of additional covariates and the sequencing of models 1-6. The covariates described here were included as controls to test for the robustness of the effects of 1.5 generation status, immigrant concentration, and race on mobility. For the most part, such covariates are significant in expected ways (mobility decreases with age, self-employment, and household size, for example, and increases with education). The direction and magnitude of such results is not surprising. However, it is worth noting that while college education (especially a bachelor's degree) has large positive effects on immigrant mobility in the absence of concentration (BA coefficient) , increasing immigrant concentration in the origin negatively moderates this education effect (BAcon coefficient). Thus, while immigrants with a BA degree are more likely to undertake an interstate move than relatively uneducated immigrants no matter the level of state immigrant concentration, this gap

is substantially reduced at the highest levels of concentration. This result introduces the possibility that later generation socioeconomic progress in immigrant state concentrations may generate only limited spatial dispersion, at least at the interstate scale.

Variables measuring state-level unemployment and employment growth were included in order to test whether the negative effects of concentration on mobility were robust to origin economic conditions, as well as to control for these effects when comparing immigrant and 1.5 generation mobility. Their introduction in model 4 diminishes racial gaps in mobility to the extent that Hispanics and whites are no longer discernibly different. At the same time, the deterrent effect of concentration increases in magnitude. These findings challenge hypotheses of "white flight" from immigrant states such as California. In short, differences between Hispanics and whites in the propensity to leave a state disappear when origin economic conditions are taken into account; rather, all groups fled negative economic conditions in the second half of the 1990s.

*Native-born/1.5 Generation Models*

These model specifications compare only the native-born and the 1.5 generation, taking native-born whites as the reference category. They are thus conceptually different from the foreign-born/1.5 generation models discussed above in allowing comparison of the mobility of the 1.5 generation with the native-born, but follow the same patterns of variable inclusion as the foreign-born/1.5 generation models discussed above. As before, most of our discussion is based on the coefficients in model 7, the fully-specified model. Main effects of race indicate that native-born Hispanics and Asians are considerably more likely than native-born whites to

move, but native-born blacks are slightly less likely to move than native-born whites.[8] While immigrant concentration exerts strong positive effects on mobility for native-born whites (the reference group), it is equally negative for 1.5 generation whites, such that these effects cancel each other out for this latter group (for example, see predicted probabilities for 1.5 generation whites in Figure 4).

Race and ethnic group interactions complicate the model Many of these interactions reverse the positive effects of immigrant concentration on mobility for the native-born: the large negative coefficients for the interaction of concentration with Hispanics and Asians show the continuing importance of immigrant presence in deterring the inter-state migration of these native-born groups. To disentangle these interaction effects more thoroughly and illustrate the effect of variable levels of immigrant concentration in the origin state we calculated predicted probabilities by race and nativity group, much as we did in the earlier model (Figure 4).[9]

Native-born whites and blacks look very similar in their response to immigrant concentration: the greater the proportion foreign-born in the origin, the higher the probability of undertaking an interstate move.[10] A already stated, concentration has no effect on mobility for 1.5 whites, as the negative effect of concentration for the 1.5 generation cancels out the positive effect of the main effect of concentration. For all other groups, however, mobility increases with decreasing concentration, and the probabilities of out-migration for 1.5 Hispanics, Asians, and blacks (as well as native Asians) are highest at the lowest levels of

[8] Once again, by specification of these models, the main effects discussed here are only valid at a hypothetical origin concentration of 0.

[9] Again, these probabilities are estimated for single, high-school educated, not self-employed men in their thirties. Other variables are set at their means.

[10] As far as state-level concentration is concerned, CA is 18% immigrant, NY is 15% immigrant, and the other states specified as immigrant states in the dichotomous models mentioned in Figure 3 (TX, NV, DC, FL, and NJ) range from 9-12% immigrant. Thus, it is important to realize that the significance of the two bars of highest concentration in this and Figure 2 represents the significance of New York and California in these models.

concentration. Odds for native Hispanics, in effect, are the inverse pattern of those for native whites, with Hispanics being nearly twice as likely to leave the least concentrated states, and about half as likely to leave the most concentrated states, as whites. Concentration is similarly related to mobility for 1.5 generation Hispanics but they are much more likely to migrate from low immigrant concentrations than native-born Hispanics. One point five generation Asians and native Asians follow the same trend as the Hispanic groups and both have very high rates of interstate migration from low immigrant concentration states. One point five generation blacks' migration behavior responds to immigrant concentration in the same manner as the other 1.5 groups, a pattern that is opposite to the trend observed for native-born blacks.




*Education and Employment Effects in the Native-born/1.5 Generation Models*

The effects of origin economic variables are reversed from models comparing the 1.5 generation with the foreign-born population. Specifically, in the native-born/1.5 generation models origin unemployment decreases mobility and origin job growth increases mobility, prompting questions about the comparative vulnerability of immigrants and natives to local

economic conditions, and the strategy of mobility as a response. Further, it is worth noting that education coefficients are of greater significance in the native-born/1.5 generation models than in earlier foreign-born/1.5 generation models, indicating a much stronger connection between college education and mobility (and between less than a high school education and *im*mobility) for natives than for immigrants.

**Conclusion and Discussion**

Although spatial assimilation theory was initially developed with reference to the mobility of minority groups on a local scale from isolated, highly ethnically-concentrated central cities to suburbs, it has informed expectations of immigrants' mobility and settlement in the U.S. at a regional scale. Discussions of continuing immigrant concentration in California or Los Angeles, for example, raise concern with immigrant clustering at regional scales, and the negative implications such clustering has for acculturation. The problem, it is stated, is not so much continuing immigration as continuing immigrant concentration. Rather than focusing on the imagined isolated disunities of unacculturated regional concentrations of immigrants, we suggest that evidence of spatially-segmented assimilation may provide opportunities to consider less territorially and ethnically inflexible ideas of belonging. Regional analysis is important in this regard, as it raises questions of exactly what America immigrants are assimilating to, and reopens questions of why we are concerned with dispersal and concentration in the first place. Why, exactly, should they matter after all? Regional scales also challenge the connections of dispersal with socioeconomic progress and acculturation. One of our more interesting findings is the fact that highly educated immigrants are less likely to migrate when residing in immigrant state concentrations, perhaps suggesting a contextual

impact on what Boyd (2000) calls "rejection of education-based mobility by immigrant offspring".

Our models show that race and context matter as much as nativity status in determining the probability of a an interstate move; and that any simple assessment of the spatial residence and mobility of the second generation must take these concerns into account when describing the future mobility, geographic or social, of the second generation or the foreign-born. While the main effects of these models indicate that on the whole the 1.5 generation is more likely to undertake inter-state migration than the foreign-born, this observed relationship falls short of indicating the dispersion predicted by spatial assimilation. Most importantly, this finding is mediated and turned upon its head by complications of ethnicity and concentrations of the foreign-born at origin. The importance of the distribution of the origin state concentration variable and its relation with propensities of different groups to leave states (as well as the varied distribution of referenced groups across these initial concentrations) challenges simple projections of second generation dispersion.

Thus our findings demonstrate that assumptions of regional spatial assimilation defined by the greater mobility of the 1.5 generation are premature. In fact, elevated interstate mobility for the 1.5 generation occurs from states with the lowest concentrations of immigrants. We plan to utilize destination-choice models to untangle where these children of immigrants are going, but this initial finding that concentration deters their mobility to an even greater extent than it does for their parents' generation is sufficient to challenge predictions of second generation dispersal. The persistence of race as a determinant of inter-state mobility, even for the native-born, further indicates the limitations of spatial assimilation frameworks. It has previously been recognized that African-Americans prove the exception to the spatial

assimilation “rule”, at least at a local level (Massey and Denton 1993, Alba, Logan, et al 1999). At a regional level and with regard to immigrants our findings suggest that the persistence of race as a determinant does more than provide an exception. Rather, it challenges the utility of the rule itself.

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**Table 1 : Summary of Covariates by Nativity**

| | **Native-born** | **Foreign-born** | **1.5 Generation** |
|---|---|---|---|
| N | 895,788 | 85,550 | 11,697 |
| % | 90.2% | 8.60% | 1.20% |
| **Race %** | | | |
| White | 83 | 43 | 45 |
| Hispanic | 4 | 26 | 36 |
| Black | 11 | 7 | 4 |
| Asian | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Other | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| **Age %** | | | |
| 20s | 9 | 8 | 20 |
| 30s | 20 | 25 | 31 |
| 40s | 23 | 25 | 21 |
| 50s | 18 | 18 | 12 |
| 60s | 13 | 12 | 3 |
| 70s | 18 | 12 | 13 |
| **Education %** | | | |
| < High School | 17 | 41 | 20 |
| High School | 30 | 18 | 21 |
| Some College | 22 | 13 | 22 |
| BA+ | 31 | 29 | 37 |
| **Other Variables** | | | |
| Self-Employed % | 10 | 12 | 10 |
| Married % | 55 | 65 | 56 |
| Female % | 34 | 29 | 35 |
| Persons (Mean) | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.3 |
| % in Concentrated State* | 31% | 69 | 63 |
| Interstate Migration Rate | 7.5 | 8 | 9.5 |

* includes CA, NY, NJ, FL, TX, DC, NV. This is for summary purposes only, and is not used in the logit models.

Table 2. Foreign-born/1.5 Generation Logit Models of Interstate Migration, 1995-2000

| variable | model 1 | model 2 | model 3 | model 4 | model 5 | model 6 | model 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.5 | -0.1468921*** | -0.1559005*** | -0.0818342 | -0.0821176 | -0.0490781 | -0.2576779** | 0.5106778** |
| **race (reference= hispanic)** | | | | | | | |
| white | 0.255912*** | 0.0994886*** | 0.0976116*** | 0.0546136 | -0.1789842* | -0.1874639* | -0.0115797 |
| black | 0.2277004*** | 0.1529892*** | 0.1520888*** | 0.1072192* | -0.1112703 | -0.155544 | -0.115406 |
| asian | 0.3145197*** | 0.2435432*** | 0.2428112*** | 0.2000311*** | 0.4480245*** | 0.420825*** | 0.503003*** |
| other | 0.355237*** | 0.2943337*** | 0.2932707*** | 0.247125*** | 0.5747301*** | .4873692*** | 0.5264475*** |
| **age cohort (reference= 30s)** | | | | | | | |
| 20s | 0.3862218*** | 0.361443*** | 0.36211*** | 0.3671999*** | 0.3655254*** | 0.3582725*** | 0.3592238*** |
| 40s | -0.5565483*** | -0.5484303*** | -0.5488412*** | -0.5473446*** | -0.5446958*** | 5400677*** | -0.540182*** |
| 50s | -1.057997*** | -1.046581*** | -1.046982*** | -1.056612*** | -1.056885*** | -1.052779*** | -1.054008*** |
| 60s | -1.122364*** | -1.105264*** | -1.104729*** | -1.107391*** | -1.100877*** | -1.098125*** | -1.100992*** |
| 70s | -1.448411*** | -1.434837*** | -1.434741*** | -1.4304*** | -1.410877*** | -1.406736*** | -1.409686*** |
| **education (reference= hs diploma)** | | | | | | | |
| < hs | -0.0929352** | -0.0859333** | -0.0862079** | -0.0793089 | -0.1775501 | -0.1792706 | -0.1486622 |
| college | 0.1062928** | 0.1352891*** | 0.1357628*** | 0.1456358*** | 0.4684001*** | 0.4719586*** | 0.4729655*** |
| BA+ | 0.6111619*** | 0.6081978*** | 0.6091687*** | 0.6120405*** | 1.246395*** | 1.246864*** | 1.246358*** |
| **other variables** | | | | | | | |
| self-employed | -0.4318629*** | -0.404232*** | -0.4040109*** | -0.4014285*** | -0.4059245*** | -0.4060116*** | -0.407139*** |
| married | 0.106657*** | 0.082761*** | 0.0830503*** | 0.0782972*** | 0.0725799** | 0.0750991** | 0.0766692** |
| female | -0.1154392*** | -0.0912719*** | -0.0911976*** | -0.0955493*** | -0.0923708*** | -0.0926483*** | -0.0936896*** |
| # persons | -0.1419776*** | -0.128742*** | -0.1288465*** | -0.1291559*** | -0.1287491*** | -0.1286896*** | -0.1290451*** |
| **origin variables** | | | | | | | |
| logcon | | -0.482529*** | -0.4771008*** | -0.5737027*** | -0.4105777*** | -0.4087486*** | -0.3681718*** |
| 1.5 con | | | -0.0367287* | -0.0351305 | -0.0442118 | -0.0213614 | -0.353686*** |
| unemp | | | | 0.0630622*** | 0.0621695*** | 0.0620618*** | 0.0620539*** |
| empchange | | | | -0.0182768*** | -0.0169813*** | -0.0169978*** | -0.0170436*** |
| **2nd-order foreign-born interactions** | | | | | | | |
| whitecon | | | | | 0.1295801*** | 0.1237213*** | 0.0405158 |
| blackcon | | | | | 0.10621 | 0.106248 | 0.0902673 |
| asiancon | | | | | -0.1130715** | -0.1168027** | -0.1523809*** |
| othercon | | | | | -0.1478661** | -0.1436931* | -0.1587161* |
| <hscon | | | | | 0.0373434 | 0.0342989 | 0.0205777 |
| collegecon | | | | | -0.1520659** | -0.1541681*** | -0.1544942*** |
| BAcon | | | | | -0.3098265* | -0.3104243*** | -0.3098942*** |
| **2nd-order 1.5 generation interactions** | | | | | | | |
| 1.5 white | | | | | | 0.1542233* | -1.001547*** |
| 1.5 black | | | | | | 0.3742286** | -0.0476297 |
| 1.5 asian | | | | | | 0.274147*** | -0.4215648 |
| 1.5 other | | | | | | 0.562128*** | 0.0657807 |
| **3rd-order interactions** | | | | | | | |
| 1.5 whitecon | | | | | | | 0.5393013*** |
| 1.5 blackcon | | | | | | | 0.1640748 |
| 1.5 asiancon | | | | | | | 0.2964368** |
| 1.5 othercon | | | | | | | 0.1971505 |
| constant | -2.054421*** | -0.9619117*** | -0.9728646*** | -0.7808136*** | -1.134051*** | -1.117003*** | -1.209557*** |

* P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3. Native-born/1.5 Generation Logit Models of Interstate Migration, 1995-2000

| variable | model 1 | model 2 | model 3 | model 4 | model 5 | model 6 | model 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.5 | 0.0288046 | 0.0148285 | 1.141853*** | 1.125131*** | 0.5860762*** | 0.557671*** | 0.6345044*** |
| **race (reference= white)** | | | | | | | |
| hispanic | -0.259877*** | -0.2896732*** | -0.2745402*** | -0.3021106*** | 0.9415692*** | 0.9389748*** | 0.9484877*** |
| black | -0.1861827*** | -0.1865194*** | -0.185845*** | -0.1795475*** | -0.2469022*** | -0.2469709*** | -0.2513496*** |
| *asian | 0.103956*** | 0.0795174** | 0.0871485** | 0.0943896** | 1.509993*** | 1.52916*** | 1.704139*** |
| other | 0.3266544*** | 0.3202037*** | 0.3201513*** | 0.3066207*** | 0.5917177*** | 0.5907521*** | 0.5737761*** |
| **age cohort (reference= 30s)** | | | | | | | |
| 20s | 0.5081471*** | 0.5124313*** | 0.5133113*** | 0.5137641*** | 0.5084063*** | 0.5082364*** | 0.5081843*** |
| 40s | -0.6051466*** | -0.605724*** | -0.6064191*** | -0.6068009*** | -0.6058661*** | -0.6055574*** | -0.6056651*** |
| 50s | -0.8676441*** | -0.8689905*** | -0.8697743*** | -0.8659328*** | -0.8649963*** | -0.8645544*** | -0.8646377*** |
| 60s | -0.8999277*** | -0.9023862*** | -0.9025905*** | -0.8965388*** | -0.8967426*** | -0.8965284*** | -0.8965449*** |
| 70s | -1.333267*** | -1.337248*** | -1.338476*** | -1.335002*** | -1.34492*** | -1.344598*** | -1.344636*** |
| **education (reference= hs diploma)** | | | | | | | |
| < hs | -0.1139647*** | -0.1110214*** | -0.1100765*** | -0.1059559*** | -0.0909794*** | -0.0910011*** | -0.0903023*** |
| college | 0.4075734*** | 0.4008608*** | 0.4003513*** | 0.3862995*** | 0.7071277*** | 0.7073043*** | 0.7074958*** |
| BA+ | 0.8263981*** | 0.8166903*** | 0.8156857*** | 0.8070276*** | 1.353854*** | 1.353878*** | 1.353657*** |
| **other variables** | | | | | | | |
| self-employed | -0.4229875*** | -0.4242554*** | -0.4236781*** | -0.4296904*** | -0.425018*** | -0.4251099*** | -0.4251365*** |
| *married | 0.079231*** | 0.081928*** | 0.0821233*** | 0.0809263*** | 0.08309*** | 0.0829661*** | 0.0830303*** |
| female | -0.0960815*** | -0.0970397*** | -0.097038*** | -0.0957923*** | -0.0975652*** | -0.097508*** | -0.0973256*** |
| # persons | -0.143052*** | -0.1429039*** | -0.1425661*** | -0.1433406*** | -0.1449343*** | -0.144918*** | -0.1448728*** |
| **origin variables** | | | | | | | |
| logcon | | 0.0394321*** | 0.045451*** | 0.0758598*** | 0.2984123*** | 0.2986813*** | 0.2988521*** |
| 1.5 con | | | -0.537336*** | -0.5220893*** | -0.2471654*** | -0.2578262*** | -0.2983471*** |
| unemp | | | | -0.025941*** | -0.0071158 | -0.0070578 | -0.0070022 |
| empchange | | | | 0.0124217*** | 0.011927*** | 0.0119427*** | 0.0119267*** |
| **2nd-order native-born interactions** | | | | | | | |
| hispcon | | | | | -0.6106962*** | -0.6110845*** | -0.6158532 |
| blackcon | | | | | 0.0369441** | 0.0348952** | 0.0375863 |
| asiancon | | | | | -0.6639836*** | -0.6615301*** | -0.7496027 |
| othercon | | | | | -0.1799315*** | -0.1835703*** | -0.172945 |
| <hscon | | | | | -0.0047616 | -0.0046219 | -0.004999 |
| collegecon | | | | | -0.2137043*** | -0.2138219*** | -0.2138489 |
| BAcon | | | | | -0.3554964*** | -0.3555863*** | -0.3554272 |
| **2nd-order 1.5 generation interactions** | | | | | | | |
| 1.5 hisp | | | | | | 0.0776307 | -0.1052867 |
| 1.5 black | | | | | | 0.351793** | 1.060021*** |
| 1.5 asian | | | | | | -0.0269627 | -0.7012403*** |
| 1.5 other | | | | | | 0.263663 | 1.026348*** |
| **3rd-order interactions** | | | | | | | |
| 1.5 hispcon | | | | | | | 0.0879823 |
| 1.5 blackcon | | | | | | | -0.3385488* |
| 1.5 asiancon | | | | | | | 0.3395563*** |
| 1.5 othercon | | | | | | | -0.376931* |
| constant | -2.207626*** | -2.262123*** | -2.271943*** | -2.318324*** | -2.64463*** | -2.644736*** | -2.645145*** |

* P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***p<0.01